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No. 98-1754

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM 1998

CITIES OF ALMA, DYER, and VAN BUREN,
Petitioners,

v.

ALBERT KRANTZ, RON DECKER, and DON SWEAT, On Behalf Of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF DYER

II. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REVERSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE APPELLATE COURT IMPROPERLY ANALYZED THE NARROWLY TAILORED STANDARD IN FIRST AMENDMENT CASES

III. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE A PREVAILING PARTY ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1988

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners

The Cities of Alma, Dyer, and Van Buren, Arkansas.

Respondents

Albert Krantz, Ron Decker, Don Sweat, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented for Review i

Parties to the Proceeding ii

Table of Contents iii

Table of Authorities iv

Opinions Below 1

Jurisdiction 1

Statement of the Case 4

Argument 6

I. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF DYER 7

II. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REVERSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE APPELLATE COURT IMPROPERLY ANALYZED THE NARROWLY TAILORED STANDARD IN FIRST AMENDMENT CASES 13

III. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE A PREVAILING PARTY ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1988 20

Conclusion 23

Appendix

Appendix A
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Filed, November 30, 1998 . . . . . 1a

Appendix B
Order Directing Appellees' Recover Costs Entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on April 23, 1999 . . . . 21a

Appendix C
Order Awarding Attorney's Fees Entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on April 13, 1999 . . . . . 23a

Appendix D
Memorandum Opinion and Judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, Filed July 30, 1997 . . . . 25a

Appendix E
Order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, Filed January 3, 1997 . . . . . 32a

Appendix F
Judgment and Memorandum Opinion of the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, Filed November 27, 1996 . . . . . 34a

Appendix G
Second Amended Complaint, Filed October 18, 1996 . . . . . 65a

Appendix H
Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on January 29, 1999 . . . . . 75a

Appendix I
Respondents' Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses for Services Rendered on Appeal 76a

Appendix J
Notice of Appeal Filed with the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas on August 28, 1997 . . . . . 81a

Appendix K
City of Alma, Arkansas, Municipal Ordinance No. 83-3 . . . . . 83a

Appendix L
City of Dyer, Arkansas, Municipal Ordinance No. 83-4 . . . . . 86a

Appendix M
City of Van Buren Arkansas, Municipal Ordinance 89a

Appendix N
Excerpts of Depositions of Decker, Sweat and Avila 92a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) 8

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,
463 U.S. 60 (1983) 14

City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
507 U.S. 410 (1993) 14, 15

City of Ladue v. Gilleo,
512 U.S. 43 (1994) 17

City Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95 (1983) 6, 10

City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41 (1986) 16

Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings,
948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991) 16

FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
493 U.S. 215 (1990) 10

Farrar v. Hobby,
506 U.S. 103 (1992) 20, 21

Hanrahan v. Hampton,
446 U.S. 754 (1980) 7, 21, 22

Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
452 U.S. 640 (1981) 17

Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298 (1974) 18, 19

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992) 6, 8, 9, 10

Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio,
319 U.S. 141 (1943) 14

Members of the City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789 (1984) 17, 18, 19

O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488 (1974) 10

Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147 (1939) 13, 14

Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452 (1974) 11, 12

United States v. Albertini,
472 U.S. 675 (1985) 16

Virginia v. American Book Sellers Association, Inc.,
484 U.S. 383 (1988) 6, 7

Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781 (1989) 16, 17, 19

Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975) 8, 10

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254 1

28 U.S.C. § 2106 1

28 U.S.C. § 2201 11

28 U.S.C. § 2202 11

42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . . . 2, 11

42 U.S.C. § 1988 . . . . . 20, 22

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) 11

U.S. Const., Amendment 1 1

U.S. Const., Article III 7, 8, 11

Ordinance

Van Buren Ordinance 5.16 2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reported at 160 F.3d 1214 (8th Cir. 1998). A copy of the Opinion is included in Appendix A at 1a-20a. A copy of the Order of the Eighth Circuit that awarded attorneys' fees and expenses is included in Appendix B at 21a-22a, Appendix C at 23-24a. The Opinions of the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas are not published and are included in Appendix D at 25a-31a, Appendix E at 32a-33a, and Appendix F at 34a-64a.

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued its Opinion on November 30, 1998. On December 14, 1998, Petitioners filed a Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing *En Banc* which the United States Court of Appeals denied on January 29, 1999 (Appendix H at 75a).* This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is filed within ninety (90) days of the denial of the Petition for Rehearing. The Court's jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1) and 2106.

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND ORDINANCE PROVISIONS

U.S. Const., Amendment 1

Congress shall make no law respecting an

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* Citations to "App." are to the Appendix fixed with this Petition for Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 14(i).

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

* * * * *

42 U.S.C. § 1983

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

* * * * *

Van Buren City Ordinance
Hand Distributed Materials

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to throw or deposit any commercial or non-commercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement in or upon any sidewalk, highway, street, boulevard, alley or other public way or in or upon any public park, square, public plaza, public recreation area or public building within the City, provided however, that it shall not be unlawful on any sidewalk, street, or any other public place in the City for any person to hand out or distribute any commercial or non-commercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement to any person willing to accept it.

SECTION 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to drop, deposit, or distribute any commercial or noncommercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement, in or upon any private premises within the City, except by handling and transmitting any such handbill or advertisement, directly to the owner, occupant, or other person then present in or upon such private premises or by so placing or depositing said advertisement so as to secure and prevent same from being blown or carried about by the elements from any said premises to other public or private place.

This Section does not apply to those commercial or noncommercial handbills or other hand distributed advertisements which the owner or occupant of the premises has given permission to be delivered to the owner or occupant of the premises or for which the owner or occupant of the premises has other contract for, solicited for, or otherwise authorized the placing or depositing of said handbills or advertisement upon the premises. Nor does it apply to newspapers. Newspapers being defined for the purpose of this Ordinance as: "A publication usually in sheet form intended for general circulation and published regularly as short intervals, containing intelligence of current events and news of general interest."

SECTION 3. It shall be unlawful for any person to place or deposit any commercial or noncommercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement upon any vehicle not his own, or in his possession, upon any public street, highway, sidewalk, road, alley within the City of Van Buren, providing, however, that it shall not be unlawful upon any such street or other public place for a person to hand out and distribute to the receiver therefor, any handbill to any

occupant of the vehicle that is willing to accept it.[1]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In June of 1995, original complaints were filed by Plaintiffs[2] in two separate actions challenging the ordinances of four Arkansas cities: Alma, Dyer, Fort Smith, and Van Buren.[3] In November of 1995, the District Court consolidated the actions, and held that the Church did not have standing to bring the action but that individuals who have been arrested for violation of the ordinances, individuals who have been threatened with arrests for violation of the ordinances, and individuals who desired to distribute handbills but refrained from doing so because of a reasonable belief that they might be arrested for violation of the ordinances, all had

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[1] Alma Ordinance No. 83-3 is identical to the Van Buren Ordinance except for the substitution of "Alma" for Van Buren; Dyer Ordinance No. 83-4 is substantially similar, substituting "Dyer" for Van Buren and omitting the newspaper provision in Section 2; and § 14-51 of the Fort Smith Code of Ordinances is substantially similar, omitting the newspaper provision in Section 2.

[2] The actions were brought in the name of the Twentieth Century Holiness Tabernacle Church and the complaints were signed by 206 members of the Church. The actions were brought without counsel.

[3] Fort Smith, Arkansas, has filed a separate Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The ordinance for the City of Alma, Arkansas is included in Appendix K at 83a-85a. The ordinance for the City of Dyer, Arkansas is included in Appendix L at 86a-88a. The ordinance for the City of Van Buren, Arkansas is included in Appendix M at 89a-91a.

standing to challenge the ordinances. The District Court ordered that an amended complaint be filed, and once that was done, permitted the case to proceed as a class action with the Plaintiffs represented by one individual from each group identified above.

On October 18, 1996, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment. On that same date, Defendants Alma, Dyer, and Van Buren filed Motions for Summary Judgment and for Judgment on the Pleadings. Defendant Fort Smith filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. By Order and Judgment dated November 27, 1996, the District Court granted all of the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment.

Defendants filed additional Motions for Summary Judgment and for Judgment on the Pleadings, and the District Court granted same on July 30, 1997. Then, Plaintiffs on August 28, 1997, filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the District Court's Order of November 27, 1996, granting summary judgment to Defendants and the Court's Order of July 30, 1997, granting judgment for the Defendants. (App. at 81a-82a.)

Before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Plaintiffs argued that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants for the following reasons: (1) in rejecting Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to ordinances that make it unlawful to distribute handbills by placing them on windshields of cars parked on public streets on the grounds that preventing litter was a substantial governmental purpose; (2) in light of Defendants' failure to come forward with evidence substantiating their asserted interest in preventing litter and Plaintiffs' submission of evidence of discriminatory

purpose, thereby dismissing Plaintiffs' "as applied" constitutional challenge to the ordinances that make it unlawful to distribute handbills by placing them on the windshields of cars parked on public streets; (3) by dismissing Plaintiffs' challenge to the ordinances on the grounds that they were enacted with the impermissible purpose of suppressing religious speech and activity; and (4) in dismissing Plaintiffs' claim for selective prosecution under the Equal Protection Clause.

After oral argument, The Eighth Circuit decided the matter on November 30, 1998. The Panel refused to address Plaintiffs' claims of selective enforcement and discriminatory enactment.

ARGUMENT FOR GRANTING WRIT

Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the ordinance of the City of Dyer, Arkansas. In finding that the Plaintiffs have standing, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals misinterpreted *Virginia v. American Book Sellers Association, Inc.*, 484 U.S. 383 (1988). The Panel's finding of standing directly contravenes the standing requirements articulated by the Court in *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), and *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). The panel erroneously found that as the City of Dyer has defended this action, such is sufficient to establish that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the ordinance.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also erred in finding that the ordinances of the three cities are overbroad. The ordinances are not overbroad under the First Amendment analysis established by this Court because they are narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate governmental interest. They also leave open ample alternative channels for communication.

The Eighth Circuit also erroneously awarded attorney's fees and expenses. This is inconsistent with the holding in *Hanrahan v. Hampton*, 446 U.S. 754 (1980). Plaintiffs have not prevailed at this point. They have only been granted the right to proceed to trial. Plaintiffs only appealed from the District Court's opinion which granted summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings to Defendants.

The need for judicial guidance from this Court is acute. The issues presented in this petition are significant and have far reaching ramifications.

ARGUMENT

I. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF DYER

The Eighth Circuit found that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge Dyer's ordinance. Such was error as the Panel misinterpreted *Virginia v. American Booksellers Association, Inc.*, 484 U.S. 383 (1988). There, this Court stated that it was not troubled by the pre-enforcement nature of the suit for two reasons. First, the State had not suggested that the newly enacted law would not be enforced, and that the plaintiffs had alleged an actual and well-founded fear that the law would be enforced against them. Second, the alleged danger was one of self-censorship which can be realized without an actual prosecution. As shown below, *American Booksellers Association* is inapposite.

Article III of the United States Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States extends only to certain enumerated classes of cases or controversies. In order to establish standing sufficient to satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III, a plaintiff in federal court must assert "'such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)(quoting *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). This Court has established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements:

> First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" -- an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of -- the injury has to be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted).

The necessity of a "real" controversy as a necessary predicate to standing under Article III has also been addressed by this Court.

Although it was claimed in that case that particular members of the plaintiff class had actually suffered from the alleged unconstitutional practices, we observed that "[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." Past wrongs were evidence bearing on "whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury." But the prospect of future injury rested "on the likelihood that [plaintiffs] will again be arrested for and charged with violations of the criminal law and will again be subjected to bond proceedings, trial, or sentencing before petitioners." The most that could be said for plaintiffs' standing was "that if [plaintiffs] proceed to violate an unchallenged law and if they are charged, held to answer, and tried in any proceedings before petitioners, they will be subjected to the discriminatory practices that petitioners are alleged to have followed." We could not find a case or controversy in those circumstances: the threat to the plaintiffs was not "sufficiently real and immediate to show an existing controversy simply because they anticipate violating lawful criminal statutes and being tried for their offenses. ..." It was to be assumed "that [plaintiffs] will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged course of conduct said to be followed by petitioners."

We further observed that case-or-controversy considerations "obviously shade into those determining whether the complaint states a sound basis for equitable relief," and went on to hold that even if the complaint presented an existing case or controversy, an adequate basis for equitable relief against petitioners had not been demonstrated:

> "[Plaintiffs] have failed, moreover, to establish the basic requisites of the issuance of equitable relief in these circumstances -- the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law. We have already canvassed the necessarily conjectural nature of the threatened injury to which [plaintiffs] are allegedly subjected. And if any of the [plaintiffs] are ever prosecuted and face trial, or if they are illegally sentenced, there are available state and federal procedures which could provide relief from the wrongful conduct alleged."

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103-104 (1983)(citations omitted), relying upon and quoting from *O'Shea v. Littleton*, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).

Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing the three elements referenced above. *FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas*, 493 U.S. 215 (1990); *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Each element must be supported exactly as any other matter on which the party bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation. *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504

U.S. 555 (1992). At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice; however, in response to a motion for summary judgment the party must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), evidence which for purposes of summary judgment motion will be taken as true. *Lujan*, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

There have not been any threats of arrest in Dyer, Arkansas for alleged violations of the handbill ordinance. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the three requirements for standing regarding the Dyer Ordinance. Plaintiffs also assert a reasonable fear of arrest and that, therefore, they refrain from distributing literature in Dyer. Such alleged fear still does not give them standing.

The issue of standing to sue where the plaintiff has been threatened with arrest but has not actually been arrested was addressed in *Steffel v. Thompson*, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). *Steffel* involved a plaintiff who brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive relief, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, for declaratory relief for alleged violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff alleged that he had been threatened with arrest and prosecution for distributing handbills on the sidewalk outside a shopping center in violation of the city's criminal trespass ordinance. He further alleged that his handbilling companion, who had refused to discontinue his activities after the threat, had in fact been arrested. The plaintiff professed a desire to continue handbilling on those premises, but that he did not do so for fear of arrest. *Steffel*, 415 U.S. at 454-456.

This Court concluded that the plaintiff did have an actual case or controversy as required by Article III of the U.S. Constitution for federal court jurisdiction because the

threats of prosecution were not "imaginary or speculative" and because the plaintiff had limited his challenge to "those specific provisions" of the law which provided the basis for the threat. *Id.* at 459. The threat to the plaintiff was found to be sufficiently concrete for purposes of Article III since the plaintiff had been warned twice and his handbilling companion had actually been arrested and prosecuted. *Id.* "In these circumstances, it is not necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights." *Id.* By limiting the finding of standing to "these circumstances," the Court indicated that, in a situation where the plaintiff has been merely threatened with arrest, the existence of an Article III case or controversy should be determined on a case by case basis.

Plaintiffs have been unable to show that they face any real and genuine threats of prosecution in Dyer, Arkansas, nor can they articulate any particular occurrence that occasioned them to legitimately fear prosecution in Dyer, Arkansas. To the contrary, all evidence indicates that they have no reasonable fear of arrest or prosecution for violation of the handbill ordinance in Dyer. Rebecca Avila stated that she does not know of anyone who has been threatened with arrest in Dyer and that she fears arrest there only because of news media articles against the church. (App. 104a-105a.) Donald Sweat, the class representative for those persons who refrain from distributing literature because they have a fear of arrest, testified that he stopped distributing literature in Dyer, not because he feared arrest, but because he no longer had any real reason to go to Dyer. (App. 65a-74a, 95a-99a.) Thus, it is clear that the City of Dyer should be dismissed from this lawsuit because the challenge made by Plaintiffs to Ordinance No. 83-4 does not present a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution.

II. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REVERSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE APPELLATE COURT IMPROPERLY ANALYZED THE NARROWLY TAILORED STANDARD IN FIRST AMENDMENT CASES

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals improperly interpreted *Schneider v. New Jersey*, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), and its progeny which resulted in it reversing the District Court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants. As is relevant to this case, the ordinances challenged in *Schneider* presented a *per se* ban on distribution of handbills.[4] None of the Ordinances before this Court impose such a restriction.

The Eighth Circuit found the following language highly instructive: "We are of opinion that the purpose to

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[4] The Municipal Code of the City of Los Angeles, 1936, provided: "Sec. 2801. No person shall distribute any hand-bill to or among pedestrians along or upon any street, sidewalk or park, or to passengers on any street car, or throw, place or attach any hand-bill in, to or upon any automobile or other vehicle."

The municipal ordinance for the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, provided: 'It is hereby made unlawful for any person * * *to* * * throw* * *paper* * *or to circulate or distribute any circular, hand-bills, cards, posters, dodgers, or other printed or advertising matter* * *in or upon any sidewalk, street, alley, wharf, boat landing, dock or other public place, park or ground within the City of Milwaukee.'

An ordinance of the city of Worcester, Massachusetts, provided: 'No person shall distribute in, or place upon any street or way, any placard, handbill, flyer, poster, advertisement or paper of any description.'

keep streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it." *Id.* at 162. The fallacy of that reliance is none of the Ordinances in the present case prohibit distributing handbills to those willing to accept them anywhere.

Building upon the above incorrect interpretation of *Schneider*, the Panel then scrutinized *Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio*, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). The point missed by the Eighth Circuit, however, was that in *Martin*, the issue was whether the distributor could deliver the information to the homes of persons obviously willing to accept it. Again, that is not the issue here. The Ordinances in question do not prohibit the distribution to anyone, anywhere they are willing to receive it. That is exactly the language used by this Court in *Struthers*, relied upon by the Eighth Circuit, but obviously misinterpreted. *Struthers* mandated that government not abridge the "[f]reedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it...." *Id.* at 146. The Ordinances here do not contravene that mandate. In fact, they affirm that principle.

Then, the Eighth Circuit reviewed *Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products, Corp.*, 463 U.S. 60 (1983), and found that its holding mandated reversal of the District Court's decision. The error in that reasoning is that *Bolger* pertained to a *per se* ban on mailings. Again, here, Plaintiffs only challenge their right to leave handbills under the windshields of unattended vehicles. Thus, *Bolger* is inapposite.

The Panel also misinterpreted *City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.*, 507 U.S. 410 (1993). The Panel correctly noted that *Discovery Network* requires a "reasonable fit" between the city's asserted goal and the means chosen;

however, the Panel failed to acknowledge that the facts in *Discovery Network* are very different from this case. In *Discovery Network*, there was ample reason to question the reason proffered by the city for the *per se* ban on news racks on public property with commercial handbills. Specifically, the city stated the reason for the ban was to prevent the visual blight caused by littering; however, the ban only removed 62 news racks while about 1,500-2,000 remained in place. Obviously, the fit between the goal and the method used to achieve it was suspect.

This Court stressed in *Discovery Network* that a regulation need not be the least severe that will achieve the desired ends; however, if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction, that is certainly relevant to the determination of whether the fit between the ends and means is reasonable. Also, the Court found relevant the fact that the ordinance relied upon by the city had long been on the books before any concern about news racks developed. The apparent purpose of the ordinance was to prevent visual blight caused by littering, rather than any harm associated with permanent, freestanding dispensing devices. Also, that the city had failed to address its recent concern about news racks by regulating their size, shape, appearance, or number indicated that it had not carefully calculated the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibition.

That is not the situation before this Court. The problem addressed by the Ordinances was persons discarding handbills left under their windshields on private parking lots as well as public streets. It is logical to assume that the person discarding the handbill does not want it, and the best way to remedy that problem is to require the distributor to give it to the person who wants it.

The Eighth Circuit also erred in adding an additional standard not required by the decisions of this Court. The Panel stated that an alternative basis for reversal of the grant of summary judgment was because the cities had failed to establish a factual basis for concluding that a cause-and-effect relationship actually exists between the placement of handbills on parked cars and litter that impacts health, safety, or esthetic well-being. In reaching that conclusion, the Panel relied upon *Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings*, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991). However, in that case, the city's contention of limiting the number of churches in a certain geographical region due to economic revitalization needed to be questioned. There is no similar analysis that needs to be done here. Discarded handbills on the ground in the parking lots and other public places where persons have placed them under the windshields of parked cars does not require an in-depth study.

The requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied "so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." *United States v. Albertini*, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985). Although Defendants are not required to show that their Ordinances are the "least-restrictive" means of accomplishing their objectives, *Ward v. Rock Against Racism*, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), Defendants may not regulate expression such that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals. *City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.*, 475 U.S. 41 (1986). In other words, the regulation must not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests":

> So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest, however, the

> regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the-government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speechrestrictive alternative. "The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations does not turn on a judge's agreement with the responsible decision-maker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests" or the degree to which those interests should be promoted." (citations omitted).

Ward, 491 U.S. at 799-800.

Defendants' ordinances are narrowly tailored to reach the Defendants' aesthetic and safety interests and they do not foreclose an entire medium of expression. *City of Ladue v. Gilleo*, 512 U.S. 43 (1994).

Closely intertwined in this analysis is the significance of the government's interest which "must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved." *Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.*, 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981).

The principle justification for Defendants' Ordinances is the prevention and reduction of litter on all property, both public and private. While this Court has held that the prevention of litter is not a sufficiently significant government interest to warrant a "prophylactic prohibition" or ban of the distribution of handbills, this Court has indicated that a "state may legitimately exercise its police powers to advance aesthetic values." *Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent*, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984) (Citations omitted).

The animus of these Ordinances is the control of litter and the prevention and reduction of litter is a significant aesthetic, environmental and safety interest of local governments. As noted by the District Court, it can certainly be said -- without much danger of contradiction -- that unsightly litter is blight in this country, the eradication of which requires the expenditure of limited local government resources, and presents a myriad of public health and safety concerns. Defendants have carefully tailored the Ordinances to advance the municipalities' interest in controlling litter by limiting only the activities which directly tend to promote an increase in litter -- the dissemination of written material on public property without recipients or receivers and the dissemination of written material on private property when the material cannot be secured from "being blown or carried about by the elements."

There is no constitutional impediment to "the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets." *Vincent*, 466 U.S. at 808-09. As stated by the Court in *Vincent*, the only right recognized by the Supreme Court is the right to tender "written material to a passerby who may reject it or accept it, and who thereafter may keep it, dispose of it properly, or incur the risk of punishment if he lets it fall to the ground." *Vincent*, 466 U.S. at 809-10. There is no constitutional right to litter -- even in the guise of free speech -- and no impediment to the punishment of persons engaging in the act of littering. The Defendants' Ordinances do not affect the recognized rights of citizens to tender "written material to a passerby." The Ordinances purport to prevent citizens from throwing papers on the streets or from placing papers in areas which will increase the amount of litter in our society. Plaintiffs seek constitutional permission to "force [their] message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it," and such was criticized by Justice Douglas in his

concurring opinion in *Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights*, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974). Therefore, the Ordinances are narrowly tailored to achieve a significant government interest.[5]

The final hurdle of a reasonable time, place or manner restriction is that alternative channels of communication must be available. While "the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable method of communication in all times and all places, a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate." *Vincent*, 466 U.S. at 812. Thus, the Ordinances must leave open ample alternative means to communicate the information. *Ward*, 491 U.S. at 802.

As stated above, traditional handbilling or leafletting, the distribution of written expression by one person to another, has not been affected by the ordinances on either

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[5] The greatest error of the Panel's decision is its dedication to preserving the rights of the Plaintiffs to distribute their literature at all costs. The Appellate Court stated that if a person does not want to have literature left on his unattended vehicle, he can notify the distributor of such. However, the issue is whether the United States Constitution, and more specifically, the First Amendment, requires an owner or operator of a vehicle to notify a distributor to not place matters underneath the windshield of his vehicle. The answer is a resounding "no".

The Panel opinion also misstated the issue raised for appellate review. Plaintiffs only challenged, on appeal, their ability to place handbills underneath the windshields of vehicles parked on public streets -- not on parking lots. Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit found that a person's vehicle is a public forum for purposes of First Amendment analysis. This court has not so held."

public or private property. Handbilling in this sense continues unimpeded as it appears that handbills may be directly distributed to any person willing to accept them in any of the defendant cities.

There are numerous other avenues for the dissemination of expressive ideas that remain unaffected by Defendants' Ordinances. The Ordinances do not prevent Plaintiffs from mailing directly to residents; from transmitting messages through use of the telephone lines, including electronic and computer media; from utilizing broadcast media and newspapers; et cetera. The alternative channels of communication are numerous and none have been foreclosed by Defendants' Ordinances.

Thus, Plaintiffs' challenge to the Ordinances cannot withstand the scrutiny laid down by this Court. The Eighth Circuit erred in reversing the opinion of the District Court, and this Court should find the Ordinances constitutional.

III. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE A PREVAILING PARTY ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (App. at 76a-80a.) On April 13, 1999 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals entered an Order awarding Plaintiffs $51,525.00 for all attorneys' fees requested and $45.00 for the expenses requested in their supplemental motion. (App. at 23a-24a.)

The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, as Amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, provides in

relevant part:

> In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of Sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this Title, Title IX of Public Law 92-313 . . ., or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . ., the Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.

This Court set forth the framework for determining whether a civil rights plaintiff is a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for purposes of awarding attorney's fees in *Farrar v. Hobby*, 506 U.S. 103 (1992).

> [T]o qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim. The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement. . . . In short, a plaintiff "prevails" when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.

Id. at 111-12.

The facts in this case are similar to those presented in *Hanrahan v. Hampton*, 446 U.S. 754 (1980). There, the Court said that the respondents had not prevailed on the merits, but rather, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit held only that the Respondents were entitled to a trial of their cause. Specifically, this Court stated:

> As a practical matter they are in a position no different from that they would have occupied if they had simply defeated the defendants' motion for a directed verdict in the trial court. The jury may or may not decide some or all of the issues in favor of the respondents. If the jury should not do so on remand in these cases, it could not seriously be contended that the respondents had prevailed.

Id. at 758-59.

As has been discussed previously, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in finding that the ordinances were unconstitutional on their face. That was not the issue presented for review. The only issue presented for review was whether the District Court erred in granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment and for judgment on the pleadings. (App. at 34a-35a.) Like in *Hanrahan*, Plaintiffs have essentially only been afforded the right to proceed to trial on the merits of their claims. They are not a prevailing party for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. They elected the issues to present on appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, and it is clear, that they did not appeal from the district court's denial of their motion for declaratory judgment.

As Plaintiffs are only entitled to a right to proceed to trial, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in finding them a prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorneys' fees and expenses.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals' decision in this case is inconsistent with established decisions from this Court. First, the Eighth Circuit Opinion misinterpreted the necessity of an actual case or controversy for a party to have standing. Second, the Appellate Court misapplied the standard for reviewing First Amendment overbreath challenges. Also, the award of attorneys' fees and costs directly contradicts the principles laid down by this Court.

The Court should grant certiorari to review and reverse the Eighth Circuit's Opinion. Otherwise, there will be constructive reversal of numerous decisions of the Court, as well as, confusion will arise in the courts of this land regarding the appropriate legal standards for these issues presented.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/_____
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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-3359

[Filed: November 30, 1998]

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas

ALBERT KRANTZ, RON DECKER, DONALD SWEAT, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Appellants,	)
v.	)
CITY OF FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS; CITY OF VAN BUREN, ARKANSAS; CITY OF ALMA, ARKANSAS; CITY OF DYER, ARKANSAS, Appellees.	)

ALBERT KRANTZ, RON DECKER, DONALD SWEAT, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Appellants,

v.

CITY OF ALMA, ARKANSAS; CITY OF DYER, ARKANSAS,
Appellees.

Submitted: February 11, 1998
Filed: November 30, 1998

Before McMILLIAN and HANSEN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS,[1] District Judge.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs, members of the Twentieth Century Holiness Tabernacle Church ("the Church") who allegedly have been arrested or threatened with legal injury pursuant to any of four specific municipal ordinances[2] (collectively referred to as "the ordinances"), appeal from final judgments entered in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, dismissing with prejudice their action pursuant to

[1] The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

[2] Alma, Ark., Ordinance No. 83-3; Dyer, Ark., Ordinance No. 83-4; Fort Smith, Ark., Municipal Code, art. III, § 14-51; and Van Buren, Ark., Ordinance No. 5-1983.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Cities of Alma, Dyer, Fort Smith, and Van Buren, Arkansas (collectively defendants). Krantz v. City of Alma, Nos. 95-2135/95-2136 (WD. Ark. Nov. 27, 1996) (Krantz) (judgment dismissing with. prejudice complaint against Alma, Dyer, and Van Buren); id. (July 30, 1997) (memorandum opinion and judgment dismissing with prejudice complaint against Fort Smith). The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on plaintiffs' First Amendment claims seeking a declaration that the ordinances are unconstitutional because they prohibit plaintiffs from placing religious literature under the windshield wipers of unattended vehicles parked on public property. Id. (Nov. 27, 1996) (memorandum opinion) hereinafter "slip op."). For reversal, plaintiffs now argue that the district court erred in holding as a matter of law that the ordinances (1) are not facially invalid on First Amendment overbreadth grounds, (2) are not unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs, and (3) were not enacted with a discriminatory purpose. In addition, defendant the City of Dyer challenges plaintiffs' standing. For the reasons stated below, we hold that plaintiffs have standing to sue the City of Dyer. We further hold that the ordinances are unconstitutional because they are facially overbroad restrictions on free speech. Accordingly, we do not reach the remaining issues raised on appeal. The judgments of the district court are reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Background

Each of the ordinances makes it a misdemeanor for any person to place a handbill or advertisement on any other person's vehicle parked on public property within city limits,

unless an occupant of the vehicle is willing to accept the handbill or advertisement. For example., the Van Buren ordinance provides in relevant part:

> SECTION 3. It shall be unlawful for any person to place or deposit any commercial or non-commercial handbill or other hand-distributed advertisement upon any vehicle not his own, or in his possession, upon any public street, highway, sidewalk, road, [or] alley within the City of Van Buren, providing, however, that it shall not be unlawful upon any such street or other public place for a person to hand out and distribute to the receiver therefor, any handbill to any occupant of the vehicle that is willing to accept it.

Slip op. at 10 (quoting Van Buren, Ark., Ordinance No. 5-1983).[3]

According to plaintiffs, "[i]n their effort to 'preach the gospel to every living person in the earth,'" associates of the Church distribute religious literature by placing handbills under the windshield wipers of unattended parked cars. Brief for Appellants at 2. Plaintiffs filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the ordinances are facially

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[3] The ordinances of the other three defendants contain substantially the same language as Section 3 of the Van Buren ordinance. Krantz v. City of Alma, Nos. 95-2135/95-2136, slip op. at 10 n.1 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 27, 1996) (memorandum opinion) (hereinafter "slip op.").

unconstitutional, that they are selectively enforced only against members of the Church, and that they were enacted with the discriminatory purpose of stopping the Church's handbilling activities, in violation of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights of free speech and free exercise of religion. The district court certified a plaintiff class, defined as individuals who have been arrested, have been threatened with arrest, or have refrained from distributing handbills because they reasonably believe they will be arrested under one of the ordinances. Plaintiffs moved for declaratory judgment, and defendants filed cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment. Plaintiffs thereafter amended their complaint, adding two new claims. Defendants then filed motions for judgment on the pleadings or partial summary judgment addressing plaintiffs' newly added claims.

By orders dated November 27, 1996, and July 30, 1997, the district court granted defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment and denied plaintiffs' motion for declaratory relief, which the court treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The district court held that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs' claim that the ordinances are facially invalid on overbreadth grounds. The district court reasoned:

> The Court is not altogether comfortable with the notion that these ordinances actually regulate handbilling -- and, therefore, speech or expression. To the contrary, the Court believes these ordinances regulate the conduct of littering -- the physical act of throwing down or depositing a piece of paper on public

> and private property. Nevertheless, since the Court believes that the effect of the ordinances -- at least to some limited extent -- can be construed as a limitation on handbilling activities, and since handbilling is an expressive activity protected by the First Amendment, the Court is of the view that the ordinances have some impact on expressive conduct.

Slip op. at 11.

The district court went on to state that it would analyze the First Amendment overbreadth issue using the constitutional standard applicable to public forums because the ordinances appeared to regulate both public and private forum speech. Id. at 14-15. The district court noted that written forms of expression in public forums are subject to reasonable time, place or manner restrictions; but that the restrictions must (1) be content-neutral, (2) be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Id. at 15. The district court first determined that the ordinances are content-neutral. Id. at 16. The district court next concluded that the ordinances are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. On that point, the district court noted that, although defendants are not required to show that their ordinances are the least restrictive means of accomplishing their objectives, they may not regulate expression so as to substantially burden more speech than necessary to advance legitimate governmental interests. Id. at 17 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,798-800 (1989) (Ward)). The district court opined that the prevention of litter is a legitimate

governmental interest, id. at 19 ("It can certainly be said -- without much danger of contradiction -- that unsightly litter is blight in this country the eradication of which requires the expenditure of limited local government resources and presents a myriad of public health and safety concerns."), and then went on to hold that "the ordinances are narrowly tailored to achieve a significant government interest." Id. at 20. Turning to the third and final requirement, the district court determined that the ordinances leave open ample alternative channels of communication because "[t]he alternative channels of communication are numerous and none have been foreclosed by defendants' ordinances." Id. at 21. Accordingly, the district court concluded, "plaintiffs' overbreadth claims against defendants are without merit." Id. at 22.

The district court further held that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issues of whether the ordinances are unconstitutionally vague, id. at 23-25, whether they regulate religious conduct within the meaning of the free exercise clause, id. at 25-26, and whether they are unconstitutional as enacted or applied, id. at 26-28; Krantz, slip op. at 5 (July 30, 1997) (addressing claims against Fort Smith). After the district court entered judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appealed the district court's disposition of the First Amendment issues. Defendants have resisted plaintiffs' appeal on the merits and, as noted above, the City of Dyer has additionally challenged plaintiffs' standing.

Discussion

Plaintiffs' standing to bring claims against the City of Dyer

The City of Dyer argues that plaintiffs lack standing to sue Dyer because no one from the Church has been arrested, has been threatened with arrest, or has refrained from handbilling because of the Dyer ordinance. Under the standard applicable to this type of First Amendment challenge, we hold that plaintiffs have standing to sue the City of Dyer for violating their First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs in the present case allege that, as part of their religion, they believe in, and engage in, the practice of distributing religious literature throughout the world and that they have refrained from leaving literature on unattended parked cars within the City of Dyer because they fear prosecution. Members of the Church have in the past engaged in the precise activity banned by the Dyer ordinance and, although no criminal proceeding is pending in Dyer, plaintiffs have presented evidence that members of the Church fear arrest or the threat of arrest should they engage in such activity in Dyer. See, e.g., Appellants' Appendix at 74, 236, 239. The Dyer ordinance is virtually identical to those of the other defendants and, in fact, has been jointly defended with two of the other ordinances challenged in this litigation. We assume the City of Dyer would prosecute violators of its ordinance, given the opportunity, because it has vigorously defended the ordinance and has never suggested that it would refrain from enforcement. See Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383,393 (1988) ("The State has not suggested that the newly enacted law will not be enforced, and we see no reason to assume otherwise.").

> When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of

> the state criminal justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles. In addition, while a pending state court prosecution provides the federal plaintiff with a concrete opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights, a refusal on the part of the federal courts to intervene when no state proceeding is pending may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding.

Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,462 (1974).

Thus, upon careful review, we hold that plaintiffs have standing to bring this declaratory judgment action to challenge the Dyer ordinance because they have alleged and have sufficiently demonstrated an actual and well-founded fear that the law in question will be enforced against them. See id. (plaintiffs have standing to challenge facial validity of regulation, notwithstanding pre-enforcement nature of lawsuit, where they allege an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against them); cf. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Smith, 742 F.2d 193, 198 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff church has standing to bring facial challenge to state statute under free exercise clause based upon "personal stake in the constitutionality of the [state] statute because enforcement of that statute will directly affect the freedom with which its members may fulfill their

professed religious commitment"). We now turn to the merits of this appeal.

Facial challenge on First Amendment overbreadth grounds

Because the material facts relevant to plaintiffs' overbreadth challenge are not in dispute and were sufficiently set forth in the pleadings, it was appropriate for the district court to dispose of that issue on the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.[4] We now review de novo the district court's decision to grant judgment on the pleadings for defendants. Franklin High Yield Tax-Free Income Fund v County of Martin, 152 F.3d 736, 738 (8th Cir. 1998) (grant of judgment on the pleadings reviewed de novo). The question before the district court, and now before this court on appeal, is whether the ordinances are unconstitutionally overbroad and thus facially invalid as a matter of law.

Plaintiffs argue that defendants have failed as a matter of law to satisfy their burden of showing that the ordinances are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the stone information. Plaintiffs suggest that defendants are precluded as a matter of law from relying on litter prevention as the basis for imposing a complete ban on plaintiffs' First Amendment activity. Plaintiffs cite, among other cases, Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162-63

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[4] Plaintiffs filed a motion for declaratory judgment seeking a ruling that the ordinances are, as a matter of law, unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore facially invalid. Slip op. at 3. The district court elected to treat plaintiffs' motion as one for judgment on the pleadings. Id. at 4.

(1939) (Schneider) ("[T]he purpose to keep the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it.").

In response, defendants argue that the ordinances are not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Schneider because the activity addressed in that case (i.e., handing out leaflets person-to-person to willing passersby) differs significantly from the act of leaving a handbill on an unattended parked vehicle. Defendants further argue that nothing in the ordinances prevents plaintiffs from engaging in the type of handbilling protected under Schneider. Defendants also contend that there is no connection between the physical act of putting a handbill under the windshield wiper of a parked vehicle and the freedom to speak, write, print, or distribute information or ideas, which plaintiffs may do by numerous other means. While defendants concede that public streets and parking lots are public forums, they maintain that they have both the duty and the power to regulate activities affecting the safety and aesthetics of such public areas through direct or indirect regulation. In sum, they contend that the ordinances are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that the ordinances leave open ample alternative channels for communication.

We find it unnecessary to repeat the district court's thorough and instructive summary of the legal landscape in this First Amendment free speech context. Slip op. at 6-9 (discussing among other cases, Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)). We also agree with the district court that plaintiffs' overbreadth challenge is governed by the line of cases addressing reasonable time,

place, or manner restrictions. See id. at 15. The three-part test for determining the constitutionality of a time, place, or manner restriction is accurately stated in the district court's opinion. See id. (citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (Discovery Network); Ward, 491 U.S. at 798; United States v. Kistner, 68 F.3d 218, 221 (8th Cir. 1995)). While we further agree with the district court's assessment that the ordinances are content-neutral under the first prong of the "reasonable time, place, or manner" test, we part company with the district court at the second stage of the inquiry. For reasons discussed below, we hold as a matter of law that the ordinances are not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.

"'[T]he requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the regulation promotes a substantial interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation' and the means chosen does not 'burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further' the city's content-neutral interest." Excalibur Group, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 116 F.3d 1216, 1221 (8th Cir. 1997) (Excalibur Group) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (internal quotations omitted)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 855 (1998). In considering whether the narrow tailoring requirement has been met in the present case, we are of the view that the Supreme Court's holding in Schneider is not directly on point, but is highly instructive. In Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162-63, the Supreme Court held that the governmental interest in preventing litter was insufficient to justify an ordinance that would have prohibited individuals from handing out literature to those willing to receive it. The Court in Schneider went on to note that a city has the power to punish individuals who throw leaflets on the ground, as opposed to those who hand leaflets out. Id.; accord Jews for

Jesus, Inc. v. MBTA, 984 F.2d 1319, 1324 (1 Cir. 1993) ("littering is the fault of the litterbug, not the leafletter"). The Supreme Court then concluded in Schneider that "the public convenience in respect of cleanliness of the streets does not justify an exertion of the police power which invades the free communication of information and opinion secured by the Constitution." 308 U.S. at 163.

Not long after Schneider was decided, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an ordinance which made it unlawful in Struthers, Ohio, for any person to distribute to a person within a residence a handbill, circular, or advertisement, by knocking on the door or fining the bell of the residence. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (Martin). The appellant in Martin, a follower of the Jehovah's Witnesses, was convicted of violating the Struthers ordinance and was ordered to pay a fine after she knocked on the door and summoned the resident of the home for the purpose of distributing religious literature. Id. at 142. The City of Struthers asserted that its ordinance advanced its legitimate governmental interests in protecting citizens from being disturbed in their homes and preventing burglars or other criminals from using such acts as a pretense for criminal activity, Id. at 144. The Supreme Court declared the Struthers ordinance facially invalid because it was not narrowly tailored to serve the city's legitimate goals. The Supreme Court observed: "While door to door distributors of literature may be either a nuisance or a blind for criminal activities, they may also be useful members of society engaged in the dissemination of ideas in accordance with the best tradition of free discussion." Id. at 145. The Supreme Court observed: "[t]raditionally the American law punishes persons who enter onto property of another after having been warned by the

owner to keep off." Id. at 147. Similarly, the Supreme Court suggested, a regulation could make it unlawful to ring the bell of a householder who has indicated a desire not to be disturbed. Id. at 147-48. The Supreme Court concluded:

> Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. The dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods, leaving to each householder the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas.
>
> . . . .
>
> A city can punish those who call at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will of the occupant and, in addition, can by identification devices control the abuse of the privilege by criminals posing as canvassers. In any case the problem must be worked out by each community for itself with due respect for the constitutional rights of those desiring to distribute literature and those desiring to receive it, as well as those who choose to exclude such distributers from the home.

Id. at 146-47 (footnote omitted); accord Rowan v. United

States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (upholding as constitutional under the First Amendment a federal statute, enforceable by the Postmaster General, which allows householders to notify senders of pandering advertisements that future mailings are not wanted).

In Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541 (8th Cir. 1995) (Van Bergen), this court considered the constitutionality of a regulation which banned certain automatic pre-recorded telephone solicitations made by "automatic dialing-announcing devices" or "ADADs." Under the facts in Van Bergen, a recipient of an ADAD telephone call had no means to reject the call beforehand or to notify the responsible party afterward that future calls were unwanted. This court carefully distinguished the circumstances of Van Bergen from Martin and held that the regulation was not unconstitutional.

> Telephone calls from a live operator are more disruptive than door-to-door solicitors warned not to disturb, because the recipient must respond once to each caller. When the call is made by a live operator, however, the recipient has the opportunity to tell the operator, at any point in the conversation, that he does not want to hear from the calling person or entity again. An ADAD does not offer the recipient the option of cutting off the calls; it does not offer householders a choice of whether to respond to the speaker or not. The ADAD recipient may hang up as soon as the message starts, but has no opportunity to tell the machine that he does not want it to call again, and may be obliged, against his will, to

> respond over and over to the same unwanted caller.
>
> . . . .
>
> Because ADAD calls intrude upon the privacy and tranquility of the home and the efficiency of the workplace, and *because the recipient has no opportunity to indicate the desire not to receive such calls,* we find that the government has a substantial interest in limiting the use of unsolicited, unconsented-to ADAD calls.

59 F.3d at 1555 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

Thus, although "[w]e will not strike down a time, place, or manner regulation merely because we can envision a less-restrictive or more effective means of furthering the city's content-neutral objectives," Excalibur Group, 116 F.3d at 1221, the "narrowly tailored" analysis, where appropriate, takes into consideration the opportunity for the would-be recipient to provide effective notice that the communications are not wanted. When that factor is considered in the present case, the balance tips in favor of striking the ordinances as overbroad because those individuals who do not want handbills placed on their vehicles can quite easily and effectively provide notice, for example, by placing a sign on the dashboard.

In Bolger v. Youngs Drag Prods., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (Bolger), the Supreme Court revisited the issue of whether a governmental regulation was narrowly tailored or burdened substantially more speech than necessary to further the

underlying governmental interest. Bolger involved a federal statute that prohibited the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives. The Supreme Court held that the statute affected commercial speech and, although commercial speech is generally accorded less constitutional protection than non-commercial speech, it nevertheless enjoys "substantial protection." Id. at 64-65, 68. The Supreme Court then observed:

> [W]e have never held that the government itself can shut off the flow of mailings to protect those recipients who might potentially be offended. The First Amendment "does not permit the government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless the 'captive' audience cannot avoid objectionable speech." Recipients of objectionable mailings, however, may "'effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.'" Consequently, the "short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can ... is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned."

Id. at 72 (citations omitted). Addressing the regulation before it, the Supreme Court noted that, although the ban on unsolicited contraceptives advertisements helped to screen such materials from the view of children, this "marshal degree of protection" required the government to screen the prohibited material from everybody's mail, even though such materials are "entirely suitable for adults." Id. at 73. The Supreme Court thus concluded "a restriction of this scope is more extensive than the Constitution permits, for the

government may not 'reduce the adult population ... to reading only what is fit for children.'" Id. (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,383 (1957)). The Supreme Court held that the regulation burdened substantially more speech than necessary to further the underlying governmental interest.

Similarly, in the present case, the ordinances suppress considerably more speech than is necessary to serve the stated governmental purpose of preventing litter. The ordinances prohibit the placement of any handbill on any unattended vehicle, regardless of whether the driver, owner, or an occupant might wish to receive the handbill and notwithstanding the fact that some, if not most, people would not throw on the ground papers left on their cars. While we have no difficulty concluding that the inconvenience of having to dispose of unwanted paper "is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned," Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72, that minor inconvenience is not even necessary in the present case because, like the householders in Martin and Rowen, those who do not wish to be left with handbills can quite easily notify distributors of that fact. As the Supreme Court reasoned in Marlin and Schneider, defendants' goal of preventing litter can be accomplished by punishing the handbill distributors who defy such notices, as well as the "litterbugs" who choose to throw papers on the ground. See Martin, 319 U.S. at 147 ("A city can punish those who call at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will of the occupant."); Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162 ("There are obvious methods of preventing littering. Amongst these is the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the street.").

Nor do we disagree with defendants' assertion that they may, consistent with prevailing constitutional standards, protect legitimate aesthetic and safety interests through indirect regulations that impose some burden on speech. However, to do so, defendants must demonstrate the existence of a "reasonable fit" between their asserted goal and the means that they have selected to accomplish it. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416 ("It was the city's burden to establish a 'reasonable fit' between its legitimate interests in safety and esthetics and its choice of a limited and selective prohibition of newsracks as the means chosen to serve those interests."). Thus, in Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991), involving a First Amendment free speech and free exercise challenge to a city's zoning ordinance, this court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant city because there was insufficient evidence that the city had studied the issues or found reliable evidence regarding the effect of the regulated activity (in that case, the location of churches in the central business district) upon the governmental interest presumably being harmed (economic revitalization).

In the present case, notwithstanding defendants' evidence that government officials received complaints about handbills left on cars and that the ordinances were enacted for the purpose of preventing litter, defendants have not established a factual basis for concluding that a cause-and-effect relationship actually exists between the placement of handbills on parked cars and litter that impacts the health, safety, or aesthetic well-being of the defendant cities. This flaw in defendants' position provides an alternative basis for reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. Id. at 469 ("The City has not provided factual

support for the assumptions that underlie its exclusion of churches, and the alleged secondary effects of churches on commercial activity remain a disputed factual issue."); cf. Excalibur Group, 116 F.3d at 1221 (affirming pant of summary judgment for defendant where the record "indicate[d] that the city had substantial evidence on which to base its conclusions about the secondary effects of adults-only businesses."). Even if we were to assume that a logical connection exists between plaintiffs' handbilling activities and the actual or potential presence of litter on defendants' streets, that correlation does not necessarily mean the ordinances are narrowly tailored to serve the purpose of preventing litter. Although a governmental restriction does not have to be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of regulation, it may not, under well-established constitutional standards, curtail substantially more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose, which is precisely what the ordinances do.

Conclusion

We hold that the challenged portions of the ordinances are not narrowly tailored to serve the governmental purpose asserted by defendants. Having therefore determined as a matter of law that the ordinances are facially invalid on overbreadth grounds, we need not address plaintiffs' remaining arguments on appeal concerning their claims of selective enforcement and discriminatory enactment. The judgments of the district court are reversed, and this case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[Filed April 23, 1999]

NO. 97-3359WAPS

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas

ALBERT KRANTZ, et al., Appellants,	)
v.	)
CITY OF FORT SMITH, AR., et al., Appellees.	)

Appellants' shall recover from the appellees the sum of $614.30 as taxable costs on appeal.

The clerk of the United States District Court is directed to place these costs in the previously issued mandate. (5232-010199).

April 20, 1999

A true copy.

ATTEST:

/s/_____
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS,
EIGHTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[Filed April 13, 1999]

No. 97-3359WAFS

Appeal from the United States
District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas

ALBERT KRANTZ, et al., Appellants,	)
v.	)
CITY OF FORT SMITH, et al., Appellees.	)

ORDER

Appellants have moved for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses for services rendered on appeal and for a supplemental award of attorneys' fees and expenses. Appellants are hereby awarded a total of $51,525.00 for all attorneys' fees requested and $45.00 for the expenses requested in their supplemental motion. Regarding the $3,471.75 in expenses appellants requested in their original

motion, appellants are directed to file within twenty (20) days of the date of this order an itemization of such expenses.

Each of the four appellees shall pay one-quarter of the amount of the total award.

April 13, 1999

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

/s/_____
Michael E. Gars
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit

APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION

[Filed July 30, 1997]

Civil No. 95-2135/95-2136

ALBERT KRANTZ, RON DECKER, DONALD SWEAT, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.

THE CITIES OF ALMA, DYER, FORT SMITH, and VAN BUREN, et al. Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

NOW on this 30 day of July, 1997, comes on for consideration a supplemental motion for judgment on the pleadings (document #143) filed by separate defendants, Cities of Alma, Dyer and Van Buren, Arkansas, and a motion for summary judgment (document #150) filed by separate defendant City of Fort Smith, Arkansas, and the Court, being well and sufficiently advised, finds and orders as follows:

1. For purposes of its analysis, the Court hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the Memorandum Opinion and Judgment entered by this Court on November 27, 1996.[1]

2. Defendants Alma, Dyer and Van Buren are seeking judgment on the pleadings with reference to two (2) new claims raised by the plaintiffs' amended complaint. In their amended complaint -- which was filed after defendants made their previous motion for judgment on the pleadings -- plaintiffs contend that the defendants' municipal ordinances violate (a) the Arkansas Constitution and (b) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. Defendants now seek judgment on both of these claims. In response, plaintiffs contend that factual issues regarding defendants' enforcement of the municipal ordinances precludes judgment on the pleadings.

3. Defendant Fort Smith is similarly seeking summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims that Fort Smith enacted its municipal ordinances with an intent to discriminate against plaintiffs; that plaintiffs have been selectively prosecuted by Fort Smith; and that Fort Smith's municipal ordinances violate the Arkansas Constitution and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. Plaintiffs object to defendant Fort Smith's motion, contending that genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute which preclude summary judgment.

---

[1] The ordinances which are being challenged by plaintiffs are set out word for word in the Court's Memorandum Opinion of that date and for that reason, will not be repeated herein.

Standard of Review

4. The Court has before it motions for judgment on the pleadings as well as a motion for summary judgment.

(a) Motions for judgment on the pleadings are governed by F.R.Civ. P.12(c) and are reviewed under the same standard as a Rule 12(b) (6) motion. *Westcott v.* City *of Omaha,* 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Thus, in ruling on Rule 12(c) motions, "all well-pleaded matters in the complaint must be accepted by a district court as true and correct." *Lone Star Industries Inc. v. Horman Family Trust,* 960 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1992). Motions for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted "unless it appears beyond a doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim which would entitled them to relief." *United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp.,* 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). *See also Lone Star,* 960 F.2d at 920, quoting *Conley v. Gibson,* 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). "The issue is not whether plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, but rather whether they are entitled to offer evidence in support of their claims. Thus, it is only in the 'unusual case' where the complaint on its face reveals some insuperable bar to relief that a dismissal . . . is warranted." *Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp.,* 872 F.2d at 1376 (citations omitted).

(b) Motions for summary judgment are governed by F.R.Civ.P. 56(c) which provides for the entry of judgment for the moving party when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and those undisputed facts warrant entry of such. In considering a summary judgment motion, all evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,* 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The nonmoving party, however, may not rest his response upon mere denials or allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial. *Celotex Corp. v.* Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); *Davis v. Fulton County, Arkansas,* 90 F.3d 1346 .(8th Cir. 1996).

5. The Court will first address the supplemental motion for judgment on the pleadings which was filed by defendants Alma, Dyer and Van Buren and adopted and incorporated by reference by defendant Fort Smith. The motion first seeks judgment on plaintiffs' claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which provides in pertinent part:

(a) Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).

(b) Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person --

> (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
> (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1996).

The Court finds that, as of June 25, 1997, plaintiffs' claim has been foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court's decision in *City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores,* 1997 WL 345322 (U.S. Tex. June 25, 1997) in which the Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as unconstitutional. Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot maintain such a claim; judgment will be entered for defendants and this claim dismissed.

6. The Court also believes that defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs' claim that defendants' ordinances are violative of the Arkansas Constitution. The Court has already determined that defendants' ordinances are not violative of the United States Constitution, see Court's Memorandum Opinion and Judgment, November 27, 1996, and the plaintiffs have failed and neglected to state a claim for relief under the Arkansas Constitution in their amended complaint. Accordingly,. defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs' claim that the ordinances violate the Arkansas Constitution.

7. The Court now turns to defendant Fort Smith's motion for summary judgment. Fort Smith says it is undisputed that the ordinances in question were adopted without discriminatory purpose and have been enforced without discrimination; Fort Smith contends that plaintiffs have offered and can offer no evidence to the contrary. Plaintiffs attempt to controvert both issues by proffering excerpts of the depositions of Donald Ray Sweat; Bill.. Reather; Ricky Sisson; Roy R. Gean, III; Larry Hammond; Ray H. Hodnett; and Wyman R. Wade, Jr.

The Court has reviewed the sworn testimony submitted by plaintiffs and finds the same insufficient to create a submissible issue on Fort Smith's alleged "selective prosecution." To prevail on this claim, plaintiffs must establish that Fort Smith made law enforcement decisions with discriminatory effects and that the decisions were motivated by a discriminatory purpose. *See Wayte v. United States,* 470 U.S. 598, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). Plaintiffs must establish that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted for violations. *United States v. Armstrong,* 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996).

None of the evidence submitted by plaintiffs indicates or supports the inference that Fort Smith's lawmaking or enforcing body enacted or enforced the ordinances in question with a discriminatory purpose or effect. Much of the proffered evidence is simply irrelevant. It does not provide proof on the issue of "selective enforcement but, rather, relates to activities of a city other than Fort Smith or it is based upon supposition.

The Court, therefore, finds that plaintiffs have submitted no evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding defendant Fort Smith's alleged discriminatory enactment of its ordinances or selective prosecution of the plaintiffs, and that defendant Fort Smith's motion for summary judgment should be granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the supplemental motion for judgment on the pleadings (document #143) filed by separate defendants, Cities of Alma, Dyer and Van Buren, Arkansas, and adopted by separate defendant City of Fort Smith, be, and it hereby is, granted;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment (document #150) filed by separate defendant City of Fort Smith, Arkansas, be, and it hereby is, granted; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/_____
JIMM LARRY HENDREN
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX E

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION

[Filed January 3, 1997]

Civil No. 95-2135/95-2136

ALBERT KRANTZ, RON DECKER, DONALD SWEAT, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,	)
v.	)
THE CITIES OF ALMA, DYER, FORT SMITH, and VAN BUREN, et al. Defendants.	)

ORDER

NOW on this 3rd day of January, 1997, comes on for consideration a Motion to Adopt by Reference the Supplemental Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Other Defendants (document #153 filed by separate defendant City of Fort Smith on December 5, 1996, and the Court, being well and sufficiently advised that there is no objection to the motion, finds that the same should be, and hereby, is

granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/_____
JIMM LARRY HENDREN
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX F

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION

[Filed November 27, 1996]

Civil No. 95-2135/95-2136

ALBERT KRANTZ, RON DECKER, and DONALD SWEAT, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,	)
v.	)
THE CITIES OF ALMA, DYER, FORT SMITH, and VAN BUREN, et al. Defendants.	)

JUDGMENT

NOW on this 27 day of November, 1996, in accordance with the Court's Memorandum Opinion entered concurrently herewith, the Court finds and orders that:

(a) plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment (document #90) be, and it hereby is, denied;

(b) defendant Van Buren's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (document #95) be, and it hereby is, granted;

(c) defendant Van Buren's Motion for Summary Judgment (document #95) be, and it hereby is, granted;

(d) defendant Alma's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (document #98) be, and it hereby is, granted;

(e) defendant Alma's Motion for Summary Judgment (document #98) be, and it hereby is, granted;

(f) defendant Dyer's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (document #92) be, and hereby is, granted;

(g) defendant Dyer's Motion for Summary Judgment (document #92) be, and it hereby is, granted;

(h) defendant Fort Smith's Motion for Partial Judgment of Dismissal on the Pleadings (document #107) be, and it hereby is granted; and

(i) plaintiffs' complaint against the cities of Van Buren, Dyer and Alma be, and it hereby is, dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/_____
JIMM LARRY HENDREN
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION

[Filed November 27, 1996]

Civil No. 95-2135/95-2136

ALBERT KRANTZ, RON DECKER, and DONALD SWEAT, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,	)
v.	)
THE CITIES OF ALMA, DYER, FORT SMITH, and VAN BUREN, et al. Defendants.	)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NOW on this 27 day of November, 1996, comes on for consideration and disposition the following:

* plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment (document #90) filed on October 18, 1996;

* defendant Van Buren's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion for Summary Judgment (document #95) filed on October 18, 1996;

* defendant Alma's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion for Summary Judgment (document #98) filed on October 18, 1996;

* defendant Dyer's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion for Summary Judgment (document #92) filed on October 18, 1996; and

* defendant Fort Smith's Motion for Partial Judgment of Dismissal on the Pleadings (document #107) filed on October 18, 1996.

After full consideration of the foregoing pleadings and the responses thereto filed by opposing parties, the Court, being well and sufficiently advised, finds and orders as follows:

Background

1. Some information about the background of this case will be helpful although the Court deems it unnecessary to set out complete details for purposes of making the rulings at hand.

The plaintiffs -- whose several claims have previously consolidated into one action by order of the Court -- are members of the Twentieth Century Holiness Tabernacle Church (the "Church") who wish to disseminate religious tracts or handbills in the cities of Alma, Dyer, Van Buren and Fort Smith, Arkansas ("Defendants"). The methods of distribution contemplated by plaintiffs are curtailed by municipal ordinances in each of the four (4) cities.

Plaintiffs contend that the defendants, through enactment and enforcement of their respective ordinances, have violated plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights of free speech and religion. They seek a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from future enforcement of the ordinances in question and, in addition, plaintiffs seek money damages by reason of past enforcement activities of defendants with respect to the said ordinances.

On May 21, 1996, the Court ruled that plaintiffs could pursue their constitutional claims as a class, with the class being composed of the three following identifiable groups which would be allowed to participate:

* individuals who have been arrested for violation of the ordinances;

* individuals who have been threatened with arrest for violation of the ordinances; and

* individuals who desire to distribute handbills but refrain from doing so because of a reasonable belief that they might be arrested for violation of the ordinances.

Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims were stayed pending resolution of their class action constitutional challenge.

Although there has been no notification of class members as previously required by the Court -- and the Court does not excuse that failure on the part of plaintiffs -- the Court will nevertheless proceed with its consideration of the constitutional issues presented by the pending motions because

it believes them to be ripe and capable of disposition at this time.

2. Plaintiffs' motion for declaratory judgment asks this Court to declare, as a matter of law, that the respective ordinances of Fort Smith, Alma, Dyer and Van Buren are both unconstitutionally overbroad and facially invalid.

The arguments advanced by plaintiffs in support of their request can be summarized as follows:

(a) that plaintiffs' distribution of handbills is conduct and speech fully protected by the First Amendment;

(b) that plaintiffs' distribution of handbills takes place on public streets and public parking lots;

(c) that public streets and the like are public forums for First Amendment analysis;

(d) that defendants' ordinances -- which plaintiffs say are, in fact, restrictions of expressive activity in public forums -are not "narrowly tailored" to achieve legitimate government objectives; they do not leave open ample alternative channels of communication; and they, therefore, are unconstitutional.

3. Defendants have responded to plaintiffs' motion and have also filed their own motions for judgment on the pleadings. They insist that plaintiffs' overbreadth arguments are without merit and they, the defendants, seek dismissal of plaintiffs' constitutional claims as being without merit.

Separate defendants Alma, Dyer and Van Buren have also filed their own motions for summary judgment, contending that their particular ordinances were not enacted for discriminatory purposes and that plaintiffs have not been selectively prosecuted by them. They ask the Court to dismiss, with prejudice, plaintiffs' claim that the ordinances are unconstitutional as applied.

Standard of Review

4. The Court has before it motions for judgment on the pleadings as well as motions for summary judgment and will treat plaintiffs' motion for declaratory relief as one for judgment on the pleadings.

(a) Motions for judgment on the pleadings are governed by F.R.Civ. P.12(c) and are reviewed under the same standard as a Rule 12(b) (6) motion. Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Thus, in ruling on Rule 12(c) motions, "all well-pleaded matters in the complaint must be accepted by a district court as true and correct." Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. Horman Family Trust, 960 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1992). Motions for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted "unless it appears beyond a doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim which would entitled them to relief." United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (Sth Cir. 1989). See also Lone Star, 960 F.2d at 920, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). "The issue is not whether plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, but rather whether they are entitled to offer evidence in support of their claims. Thus, it is only in the 'unusual case' where the complaint on its face

reveals some insuperable bar to relief that a dismissal . . . is warranted." Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d at 1376 (citations omitted).

(b) Defendants' motions for summary judgment are governed by F.R.Civ. P. 56(c) which provides for the entry of judgment for the moving party when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and those undisputed facts warrant entry of such. In considering a summary judgment motion, all evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The non-moving party, however, may not rest his response upon mere denials or allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Davis v. Fulton County, Arkansas, 90 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1996).

In order of dispose of the several motions, it will be appropriate for the Court to discuss certain general topics which are fairly raised in all of them.

I. Freedom of Speech

5. A principal concern of plaintiffs is that enforcement of the ordinances in question impermissibly impinges upon their rights of free speech as protected under the United States Constitution. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the concept of "freedom of speech" as it relates to the situation at hand.

The United States Supreme Court has characterized the freedom of speech as a fundamental personal right and liberty. Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed.2d 155 (1939). The freedom of speech "secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States is similarly secured to all persons by the Fourteenth against abridgment by a state" or by a municipality. Schneider, 308 U.S at 160. Thus, "[i]t has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing space and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judgment that a particular mode of expression has to give way to other compelling needs of society." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916-17, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973).

(a) Overbreadth: Plaintiffs say that the ordinances' "rational relationship with [their] stated purpose of eliminating litter is minimal, there is an inadequate nexus with the stated goal of eliminating litter, and [they] proscribe conduct which is protected under the First Amendment." Plaintiffs' Class Action Allegations, Amended Complaint, ¶ 28. Plaintiffs contend, therefore, that the ordinances are unconstitutionally overbroad. An "overbreadth" challenge is based upon the contention that particular ordinances "are written so broadly that they may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of [not only those before the Court but also] third parties." Vincent, 466 U.S. at 798. This concept of overbreadth -- sometimes referred to as "facial invalidity" -- has been characterized as "manifestly strong medicine" and is sparingly applied by the courts. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 93 S.Ct. at 2916. Courts are especially hesitant to utilize the concept when it is invoked with respect to ordinary criminal laws

which may apply to protected conduct. Id.

The overbreadth concept has its source in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) where the Supreme Court concluded that the very existence of some broadly written statutes may have such a deterrent effect on free expression that they should be subject to challenge by a party whose own conduct may be unprotected. Id. Thus, in analyzing an overbreadth challenge, the Court is authorized to consider the ordinances' impact not only upon those actually impacted but also upon those whose constitutionally protected speech may be inhibited by the ordinances. This, then, is an exception to the general standing rule "predicated on a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." Vincent, 466 U.S. at 799, 104 S.Ct. at 2125. However, "there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds." Id. at 801, 104 S.Ct. at 2126.

It should also be noted that, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well." Id. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2917; see also City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799-801, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2125-26, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770-71, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361-62, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). "[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an over-breath challenge." Vincent, 466 U.S. at 800, 104 S.Ct. at 2126.

To evaluate an overbreadth claim, the Court must determine whether the challenged ordinances feature reasonable time, place or manner restrictions and, to do so, it must apply a three part test. See Pursley v. City of Fayetteville, Arkansas, 820 F.2d 951, 954 (8th Cir. 1987). That test includes: (1) whether the speech is protected speech; (2) if so, in what "forum" it is to be expressed or exercised; and (3) whether, in that forum, there are constitutionally acceptable justifications for limiting what would otherwise be protected speech.

So, the first question here is whether plaintiffs' activity is speech protected by the First Amendment. If so, the next task for this Court is to "identify the nature of the forum, because the extent to which the Government may limit access depends on whether the forum is public or nonpublic." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 105. S.Ct. 3439, 3446-47, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985). Finally, in light of what has been determined in the first two inquiries, it must be decided whether the justifications for excluding expressive activity satisfy the relevant constitutional standard. Pursley, 820 at 954.

The Court will, therefore, examine the facts at hand in light of the foregoing.

(1) Protected Speech: Plaintiffs challenge four particular criminal ordinances of the cities of Fort Smith, Van Buren, Alma and Dyer which restrict leafletting or handbilling in certain areas of the respective cities.

Van Buren's Ordinance No. 5-1983, which is substantially similar to and representative of each of the

challenged ordinances, provides in part:

> SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to throw or deposit any commercial or non-commercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement in or upon any sidewalk, highway, street, boulevard, alley or other public way or in or upon any public park, square, public plaza, public recreation area or public building within the City, provided however, that it shall not be unlawful on any sidewalk, street, or any other public place in the City for any person to hand out or distribute any commercial or non-commercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement to any person willing to accept it.
>
> SECTION 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to drop, deposit, or distribute any commercial or noncommercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement, in or upon any private premises within the City, except by handling and transmitting any such handbill or advertisement directly to the owner, occupant, or other person then present in or upon such private premises or by so placing or depositing said advertisement so as to secure and prevent same from being blown or carried about by the elements from any said premises to other public or private places.
>
> This Section does not apply to those

> commercial or non-commercial handbills or other hand distributed advertisements which the owner or occupant of the premises has given permission to be delivered to the owner or occupant of the premises or for which the owner or occupant of the premises has other contract for, solicited for, or otherwise authorized the placing or depositing of said handbills or advertisement upon the premises. Nor does it apply to newspapers. Newspapers being defined for the purpose of this Ordinance as: "A publication usually in sheet form intended for general circulation and published regularly as short intervals, containing intelligence of current events and news of general interest."
>
> SECTION 3. It shall be unlawful for any person to place or deposit any commercial or non-commercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement upon any vehicle not his own, or in his possession, upon any public street, highway, sidewalk, road, alley within the City of Van Buren, providing, however, that it shall not be unlawful upon any such street or other public place for a person to hand out and distribute to the receiver therefor, any handbill to any occupant of the vehicle that is willing to accept it.[1]

---

[1] Alma Ordinance No. 8-3 is identical to the Van Buren Ordinance except for the substitution of "Alma" for Van Buren;

While the Court believes there is little doubt that handbilling or leafletting is an "expressive activity involving 'speech' protected by the First Amendment," United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1706, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983), the Supreme Court has recognized that the right to handbill extends only the right to distribute literature to those "willing to receive it." Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939). The First Amendment does not extend the right to force handbills on unwilling recipients on public property nor does it extend a right to intrude uninvited onto private property. Id.

The Court is not altogether comfortable with the notion that these ordinances actually regulate handbilling -- and, therefore, speech or expression. To the contrary, the Court believes these ordinances regulate the conduct of littering -- the physical act of throwing down or depositing a piece of paper on public and private property. Nevertheless, since the Court believes that the effect of the ordinances -- at least to some limited extent -- can be construed as a limitation on handbilling activities, and since handbilling is an expressive activity protected by the First Amendment, the Court is of the view that the ordinances have some impact on expressive conduct. In light of its belief that defendants' ordinances may touch upon protected speech, the Court will proceed to consider the nature of the regulated forum.

Dyer Ordinance No. 83-4 is substantially similar, substituting "Dyer" for Van Buren and omitting the newspaper provision in Section 2; and § 14-51 of the Fort Smith Code of Ordinances is substantially similar, omitting the newspaper provision in Section 2.

(2) Nature of Forum: The Court recognizes that "the standards by which limitations on speech must be evaluated 'differ depending on the character of the property (where or on which it is sought to be expressed) at issue.'" Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,-479, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2500, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988).

If the forum is a "public" one, the state's ability to limit expressive activity is "sharply circumscribed." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983).

The plain language of the ordinances purports to regulate public sidewalks, highways, streets, boulevards, alleys, other public ways, public parks, squares, plazas, public recreation areas and public buildings within the City. They also purport to place restrictions with respect to private premises within the City as well as with respect to all vehicles -- private and public -- located on public streets, highways, sidewalks, roads, or alleys within the city limits.

Several Supreme Court cases have held streets and the like to be traditional public forums:

> Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.

> The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all . . . but it must not, in the guise of a regulation, be abridged or denied.

Hague v. Committee for Indus. Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16, 59 S.Ct. 954, 964, 83 L.Ed.2d 1423 (1939). "[S]treets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places are so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights that access to them for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot be constitutionally denied broadly and absolutely." Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 515, 96 S.Ct. 1029, 1034, 47 L.Ed.2d 196 (1976). "[T]ime out of mind" public streets and sidewalks have been used for public assembly and debate, the hallmarks of a traditional public forum. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2500, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988). "'[P]ublic places' historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to be 'public forums.'" United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177, 103 S.Ct. at 1707.

In light of the clear wording of the ordinances and the teachings of Supreme Court precedents, the Court concludes that defendants' ordinances affect conduct which may encompass the exercise of First Amendment rights in public forums -- sidewalks, highways, streets, boulevards, alleys, parks, squares, plazas, public recreation areas, public buildings and other public areas.

The foregoing conclusion does not, however, serve to

invalidate the ordinances or to end the inquiry.

First, it must be noted that the government is permitted -- even in public forums -- to impose reasonable time, place or manner restrictions on expressive activities, Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 1516, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993). "Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985). Accordingly, further inquiry is in order with respect to the public forum matter.

Second, it is noted that the ordinances also purport to curtail conduct which could affect expressive activity on private premises and on privately owned vehicles parked in public places. Accordingly, further inquiry is in order with respect to the private forum matter.

The fact is that, under settled interpretations of the federal constitution, individuals do not enjoy the same constitutionally protected freedom of expression on private premises as they traditionally do enjoy in public forums. Accordingly, the government is afforded more leeway in regulating speech by third parties on privately owned property. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162-63.

Since the ordinances in question appear to regulate both public and private forums, the Court believes it appropriate to conduct its analysis with reference to the constitutional standard applicable with respect to public forums. This is appropriate, in the Court's view, because if the ordinances are found to be constitutional under the more

stringent public forum analysis, it logically follows that they would also be found to be constitutional under the less rigorous standard appropriate for private forum analysis.

(3) Restrictions -- Reasonable Time, Place or Manner: The Court now considers whether defendants' justifications for excluding the expressive activity and the means used by them to carry out their goal are constitutionally permissible.

As previously noted, written expression in public forums is subject to reasonable time, place or manner restrictions. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 1516, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2753, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989); United States v. Kistner, 68 F.3d 218, 221 (8th Cir. 1995). Restrictions, however, must be (a) content neutral, (b) narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and (c) leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Id.

(i) Content Neutrality: The Constitution does not permit government to regulate speech because it disagrees with its content or message. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3070, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). A regulation is content neutral if the government can justify the restriction without reference to the content of the regulated activity. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 296, 104 S.Ct. at 3070. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48,

106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). Here, defendants argue, and plaintiffs concede, that the ordinances are content neutral.

The Court agrees that none of the ordinances reference the content or message of any handbill or advertisement regulated. Additionally, there is no evidence that defendants have "adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys." Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. The ordinances -- outlining criminal and prohibited conduct in plain language -- apply evenhandedly to "any person" -- and not just to plaintiffs or to those holding similar beliefs. Thus, the fact that the ordinances may have an incidental effect on some speakers or messages -- but not others -- does not render the ordinances invalid on that score.

(ii) Narrowly Tailored -- Significant Governmental Interest: It is well-established that the "government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963) (citation omitted). Thus, even content neutral restrictions on expressive activity must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. Ward, 491 U.S. at 789, 109 S.Ct. at 2753.

The requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied "so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985). Although defendants are not required to show that their ordinances are the "least-restrictive" means of accomplishing their objectives, Ward, 491 U.S. at 798, 109 S.Ct. at 2357, defendants "may not

regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals." Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52, 106 S.Ct. at 931. In other words, the regulation must not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests":

> So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest, however, the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative. "The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations does not turn on a judge's agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests" or the degree to which those interests should be promoted." (citations omitted).

Ward, 491 U.S. at 799-800.

The Court believes that the ordinances in question are narrowly tailored to reach the defendants' aesthetic and safety interests and that they do not "foreclose an entire medium of expression." City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 2045, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994).

The Court wishes to emphasize that which it believes to be both important -- and obvious -- that these ordinances neither ban nor abolish traditional handbilling or leafletting.

With the ordinances in place and being enforced, such activities may continue unfettered in all public places *provided* that the distribution is personal -- i.e. from "any person" with a handbill to "any person willing to receive it." The Court believes that the conduct clearly prohibited by the ordinances is that of throwing down or depositing handbills in the absence of any specifically intended receiver or recipient -- i.e., littering.

Accordingly, the Court believes that the dissemination of expressive materials in "quintessential public forums" can clearly continue in the cities in question unaffected by defendants' ordinances.

It also follows, the Court believes, that handbilling on private property is clearly still permissible if conducted with permission of the owner of that property or otherwise in a manner which will not legally amount to littering of the property under the criteria discussed above.

Closely intertwined in this analysis is the significance of the government's interest which "must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved."Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981).

The principle justification for defendants' ordinances is said to be the prevention and reduction of litter on all property, both public and private. While the Supreme Court has held that the prevention of litter is not a sufficiently significant government interest to warrant a "prophylactic prohibition" or ban of the distribution of handbills, that Court

has indicated that a "State may legitimately exercise its police powers to advance aesthetic values." Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808, 805. (citations omitted).

This Court believes that the animus of these ordinances is the control of litter and that the prevention and reduction of litter is a significant aesthetic, environmental and safety interest of local governments. It can certainly be said -- without much danger of contradiction -- that unsightly litter is blight in this country the eradication of which requires the expenditure of limited local government resources and presents a myriad of public health and safety concerns.

The Court believes that defendants have carefully tailored the ordinances to advance the municipalities' interest in controlling litter by limiting only the activities which directly tend to promote an increase in litter -- the dissemination of written material on public property without recipients or receivers and the dissemination of written material on private property when the material cannot be secured from "being blown or carried about by the elements."

The Court further believes there is no constitutional impediment to "the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets." Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808-09. As stated by the Court in Vincent, the only right recognized by the Supreme Court is the right to tender "written material to a passerby who may reject it or accept it, and who thereafter may keep it, dispose of it properly, or incur the risk of punishment if he lets it fall to the ground." Vincent, 466 U.S. at 809-10. There is no constitutional right to litter -- even in the guise of free speech -- and no impediment to the punishment of persons engaging in the act of littering. Again,

the Court expresses its belief that these ordinances do not affect the recognized rights of citizens to tender "written material to a passerby." The ordinances purport to prevent citizens from throwing papers on the streets or from placing papers in areas which will increase the amount of litter in our society. The Court thus finds that the ordinances are narrowly tailored to achieve a significant government interest.

(iii) Alternative Channels of Communication:

The final hurdle of a reasonable time, place or manner restriction is that alternative channels of communication must be available. While "the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable method of communication in all times and all places, . . a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate." Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812, 104 S.Ct. at 2132. Thus, the ordinances must leave open ample alternative means to communicate the information. Ward, 491 U.S. at 802, 109 S.Ct. at 2760.

As stated above, traditional handbilling or leafletting -- the distribution of written expression by one person to another -- has not been affected by the ordinances on either public or private property. Handbilling in this sense apparently continues unimpeded as it appears that handbills may be directly distributed to any person willing to accept them in any of defendant cities.

It also appears that the ordinances in question do not impair handbilling on private property, with permission, in any of the defendant cities. In fact, it appears that the ordinances in question even permit handbilling on private

property -- without permission -- when the handbill can be secured from being blown away. It appears, therefore, that in each of defendant cities handbilling as a channel of communication for plaintiffs' message, while circumscribed, has been preserved.

The Court notes that numerous other avenues for the dissemination of expressive ideas remain unaffected by defendants' ordinances. The ordinances do not prevent plaintiffs from mailing directly to residents; from transmitting messages through use of the telephone lines, including electronic and computer media; from utilizing broadcast media and newspapers; et cetera. The alternative channels of communication are numerous and none have been foreclosed by defendants' ordinances.

(4) No Significantly Difference Impact: Finally, in order to sustain an overbreadth challenge, plaintiffs "must identify a significant difference" between their own claim that the ordinances are unconstitutional as applied and their claim that the ordinances are invalid on overbreadth grounds. Van Bergen, 59 F.3d at 1549. Plaintiffs have simply failed and neglected to identify any significant difference between the claim that defendants' ordinances are unconstitutional as applied and unconstitutional on their face.

Because the challenged ordinances regulate conduct -- handbilling or leafletting -- any overbreadth which might be found to exist must be "substantial." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. This means that there must be a "realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise First Amendment protection of parties not before the Court." Vincent, 466 U.S. at 800. The Court finds that there is no realistic danger that

the ordinances in question will compromise the First Amendment rights of any party, whether presently before the Court or otherwise. The ordinances regulate litter -- an unsightly, untidy and offensive criminal activity -- and no citizen maintains a constitutional right to engage in littering even if the paper strewn about contains a message which is otherwise expressive and protected by the First Amendment.

In summary, the Court finds that the challenged ordinances meet the requirements of reasonable time, place or manner restrictions of speech protected by the First Amendment. The defendants are advancing a substantial interest in aesthetics, health and safety which is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech; the ordinances are narrowly tailored to advance this interest and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs' overbreadth claims against defendants are without merit. The Court will thus grant defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings on the overbreadth claim and deny plaintiffs' motion for declaratory judgment on their overbreadth claim.

(b) Vagueness: Plaintiffs also challenge the relevant ordinances as unconstitutionally "vague."

The Supreme Court has determined that an ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague if it is "set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest." United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 579, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973).

The vagueness doctrine requires that an ordinance satisfy three requirements: (a) the ordinance must give "fair notice of the conduct prohibited; (b) the ordinance must "provide sufficient guidance to officials so that 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement' is avoided;" and (c) the ordinance "must be sufficiently clear so that the exercise of constitutionally protected rights is not restrained." Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Minnesota, 910 F.2d 479, 482 (8th Cir. 1990), quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). The burden is on the challenger to "'demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications' . . . and that the statute could never be applied in a valid manner." Planned Parenthood, 910 F.2d at 482, quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497. 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982).

(1) In Grayned, the Court stated that a vague law fails to provide citizens reasonable notice of what the law prohibits and allows, and thus will "trap the innocent by not providing fair warning." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108, 92 S.Ct. at 2298. The defendants' ordinances cannot be characterized as "traps" for the unwary. The ordinances are specific in their prohibitions, delineating permissible handbilling from impermissible littering and designating where such activities are allowed and where they are curtailed. The Court concludes that the ordinances provide clear, fair warning of criminal conduct.

(2) The second concern is that a vague law "impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,

judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." Id. at 108-09, 92 S.Ct. at 2298-99. This analysis originated in licensing schemes and has limited application outside that context. In this case the Court believes that the defendant's criminal ordinances do not vest any law enforcement personnel with discretionary power.

(3) The final concern is that "where a vague statute abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it chills First Amendment activity by causing citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." Id. at 109, 92 S.Ct. at 2299. Although First Amendment freedoms are implicated here, there is no risk of chilling protected activity because protected activity is permitted and impermissible unprotected conduct is clearly delineated in plain language. The ordinances are not vague and the Court finds that they have only a tangential effect on plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights. Accordingly, the Court finds plaintiffs' claims that defendants' ordinances are vague to be without merit. The Court will therefore grant defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs' vagueness claim and deny plaintiffs' motion for declaratory judgment on their vagueness claim.

(c) Freedom of Religion -- First Amendment: Plaintiffs further contend that distribution of their literature is an integral part of their religious practice; that the ordinances impermissibly interfere with the distribution of literature; and therefore, the ordinances interfere with plaintiffs' free exercise of religion.

The Court first observes that "a neutral law of general applicability that incidentally impinges on religious practice will not be subject to attack under the free exercise clause." Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472 (Sth Cir. 1991), citing Employment Div., Dept. of Human Servs. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). To prevail on this claim, therefore, plaintiffs must establish that the government is attempting to regulate religious belief or religious-based conduct, or that the First Amendment is being violated in conjunction with other constitutional protections. Id.

The Court finds that these ordinances have no significant impact on religious belief and should not be construed as directly regulating religious-based conduct. The ordinances are general criminal laws that apply to any attempt to litter by throwing down handbills on public and private property. There is absolutely no evidence that the defendants have an anti-religious agenda or purpose in enforcing the ordinances. Absent evidence of the defendants' intent to regulate religious worship, these ordinances are properly viewed as neutral laws of general applicability and permissible under the teachings of Smith and Cornerstone.

Accordingly, judgment on the pleadings will be granted for defendants on plaintiffs' claims that the ordinances infringe upon plaintiff's constitutionally protected right to free exercise of religion; plaintiffs' motion for declaratory judgment on this claim will be denied.

(d) Unconstitutional Application Argument: The motions for summary judgment filed by defendants Van Buren, Alma, and Dyer also seek judgment on plaintiffs'

challenge alleging unconstitutional application of the ordinances. The City of Fort Smith has not filed a motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim that the ordinances are unconstitutionally applied and thus this ruling neither reaches nor affects that particular claim maintained by plaintiffs against the city of Fort Smith.

Plaintiffs allege that the ordinances were enacted with specific intent to stop plaintiffs' dissemination of religious literature. A discriminatory purpose in the enactment of an ordinance "implies that the decisionmaker . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of' not merely 'in spite of' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1172, 130 L.Ed.2d 1126 (1995). "Discriminatory purpose thus implies even more than an awareness of consequences." United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1412, 131 L.Ed.2d 297 (1995) .

The Court believes that the ordinances are neutral on their face as applicable to all persons and that their single purpose is the prevention of additional litter on all property, both public and private. Furthermore, the Court finds that plaintiffs have produced no evidence from which a finder of fact could reasonably conclude that the defendants engaged in intentional discrimination against plaintiffs when enacting these ordinances. Once defendants filed their motions for summary judgment, the burden was upon plaintiffs to go outside the pleadings and to meet proof with proof, illustrating that a genuine issue remained for trial. The Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to sustain this burden.

(e) Selective Prosecution Argument: Plaintiffs further contend that they have been selectively prosecuted for violation of the ordinances. In order to prove selective prosecution or selective enforcement of a law, it must be shown that the enforcement decision had a discriminatory effect and it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985); United States v. Brown, 9 F.3d 1374 (Sth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1568, 128 L.Ed.2d 213 (1994). So long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined under the law, the decision whether or not to prosecute rests entirely in his discretion. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 1477, 55 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978).

Again, the Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the burden imposed. There is no evidence in the record from which a fact finder could conclude that any enforcement decision on behalf of the defendants had a discriminatory effect on the plaintiffs or that any enforcement decision was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Absent such evidence, the Court is left with no alternative but to grant defendants' motions and dismiss these claims with prejudice.

Conclusion

It follows, from what has been said and for the reasons set forth herein above, that:

(a) plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment (document #90) should be, and it hereby is, denied;

(b) defendant Van Buren's Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings (document #95) should be, and it hereby is, granted;

(c) defendant Van Buren's Motion for Summary Judgment (document #95) should be, and it hereby is, granted;

(d) defendant Alma's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (document #98) be, and it hereby is, granted;

(e) defendant Alma's Motion for Summary Judgment (document #98) should be, and it hereby is, granted;

(f) defendant Dyer's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (document #92) should be, and hereby is, granted;

(g) defendant Dyer's Motion for Summary Judgment (document #92) be, and it hereby is, granted;

(h) defendant Fort Smith's Motion for Partial Judgment of Dismissal on the Pleadings (document #107) should be, and it hereby is granted; and

(i) plaintiffs' complaint against the cities of Van Buren, Dyer and Alma be, and it hereby is, dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/_____
JIMM LARRY HENDREN
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX G

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION

[Filed: October 18, 1996]

Case No. 95-2135/95-2136
(consolidated)

ALBERT KRANTZ, RON DECKER, AND DON SWEAT, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,	)
v.	)
THE CITIES OF ALMA, DYER, FORT SMITH AND VAN BUREN, Defendants.	)

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT -- CLASS ACTION
(Local Rule C-9)

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

This action is brought pursuant to Rule 23, F.R.C.P., and is maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2), F.R.C.P. The Plaintiff class in this action is divided into three cognizable subclasses: (1) Those who have been arrested

as a result of Defendant's unconstitutional ordinances; (2) Those who have been threatened with arrest as a result of Defendant's unconstitutional ordinances; and (3) Those who would like to distribute religious literature, but have refrained from doing so because they reasonably fear arrest. The three subclasses collectively amount to approximately 150 persons, with 50 persons in each class. The named plaintiff for Subclass 1 (persons who have been arrested as a result of Defendant's unconstitutional ordinances) is Albert Krantz. Albert Krantz is a suitably representative plaintiff for Subclass 1. His claims are typical of the claims of his Subclass, he has been arrested for attempting to distribute religious literature, his questions of law are identical to the rest of his Subclass, and he will fairly and adequately protect the interests of Subclass 1. The named plaintiff for Subclass 2 (persons who have been threatened with arrest as a result of Defendant's unconstitutional ordinances) is Ron Decker. Ron Decker is a suitably representative plaintiff for Subclass 2. His claims are typical of the claims of his Subclass, he has been threatened with arrest for attempting to distribute religious literature, his questions of law are identical to the rest of his Subclass, and he will fairly and adequately protect the interests of Subclass 2. The named plaintiff for Subclass 3 (persons who would like to distribute religious literature, but refrain from doing so because they reasonably fear arrest) is Don Sweat. Don Sweat is a suitably typical plaintiff for Subclass 3. His claims are typical of the claims of his Subclass, he would like to distribute religious literaturew, but refrains from doing so from a reasonable fear of arrest, his questions of law are typical to the rest of his Subclass, and he will fairly and adequately protect the interests of Subclass 3. The three Subclasses alleged, and all members herein, share specific questions of fact and law; particularly, whether the ordinances

of the Defendant cities unconstitutionally restrict Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights of Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Expression, whether Plaintiffs' right to Equal Protection under the law has been violated, and whether the actions of certain named Defendants amount to deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

AMENDED COMPLAINT

1. This is a class action lawsuit brought by the above-named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated. There are three subclasses in the Plaintiff class: (1) Those who have been arrested as a result of Defendant's unconstitutional ordinances; (2) Those who have been threatened with arrest as a result of Defendant's unconstitutional ordinances; and (3) Those who would like to distribute religious literature, but have refrained from doing so because they reasonly fear arrest. Albert Krantz is the class representative for subclass (1), in that he is a suitable representative of that subclass's interests and he has been arrested while attempting to distribute religious literature. Ron Decker is the class representative for subclass (2), in that he is a suitable representative of that subclass's interests and he has been threatened with arrest for attempting to distribute religious literature. Don Sweat is the class representative for subclass (3), in that he is a suitable representative of that subclass's interests and wishes to distribute religious literature but refrains from doing so out of a reasonable fear of arrest.

2. Defendants are municipal corporations organized and existing under the laws of Arkansas.

3. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the Plaintiff class, seek injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendants on the grounds that Defendants' municipal ordinances violate Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs further seek reimbursement of fines, costs and expenses incurred as a result of Defendants' unconstitutional ordinances; punitive damages; attorney's fees and costs.

4. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other persons listed in paragraph one, above.

5. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. The class consists of three subclasses of approximately 50 persons each, for an approximate total of 150 persons.

6. There are questions of law and fact common to each member of the class, including but not limited to the constitutionality of the below-listed municipal ordinances and their application.

7. The conditions, practices, policies, and treatment challenged in this Complaint apply with equal force to the named Plaintiffs and to each member of each subclass.

8. Named Plaintiffs will fairly and diligently represent the interests of the class because they possess the requisite personal interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit. They are represented by counsel who practices law in federal courts on a regular basis, and who is familiar with Plaintiffs' situation.

9. Defendants have acted or have refused to act on

grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making final injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate to the class as a whole. Rule 23(b)(2), F.R.C.P.

JURISDICTION

10. Plaintiff's request for declaratory and injunctive relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and § 2202.

11. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343(3) and (4). Count Four, infra, is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

12. In April 1983, Alma, Arkansas, enacted ordinance no. 83-3, relating to the distribution of handbills in the city. The ordinance made it illegal to drop, deposit, or distribute handbills or leaflets within the city limits of Alma, Arkansas, except with certain constrictive exceptions. Section Three forbids placing handbills on the windshield of parked cars.

13. In May 1983, Dyer, Arkansas, enacted ordinance no. 83-4. The ordinance made it illegal to drop, deposit, or distribute handbills or leaflets, except with certain constrictive exceptions. Section three forbids placing handbills on the windshield of parked cars.

14. In 1976, the city of Fort Smith, Arkansas, enacted ordinance no. 14-51. The ordinance made it illegal to drop, deposit, or distribute handbills of leaflets, except

with certain constrictive exceptions. Subsection (c) of this ordinance forbids placing handbills on the windshield of parked cars.

15. In 1983 the city of Van Buren, Arkansas, enacted ordinance chapter 5.16. The ordinance made it illega to drop, deposit, or distribute handbills or leaflets, except for certain constrictive restrictions. Section 5.16.03 forbids placing handbills on the windshield of parked cars.

16. The Plaintiffs have for more than 20 years, and prior to enactment of the above-listed ordinances, distributed religious tracts and literature in the four above-listed cities. Plaintiffs distribute the religious literature by handing them directly to members of the public or by placing the literature under the windshield wipers of parked cars.

17. Distributing religious tracts and literature is an integral part of Plaintiffs' religious practice, which places special emphasis on proselytizing and spreading Christian gospel through distribution of religious literature and personal contact.

18. The above-cited ordinances were justified as being, in part, enacted to prevent nuisance and as anti-littering ordinances.

19. The anti-littering and nuisance explanations are pretextual, as the above-cited ordinances were enacted specifically to stop Plaintiffs' religious practice of proselytization and disseminating religious tracts and literature.

20. These ordinances are unconstitutional, both facially and as applied, and violate Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press and or in contravention of the United States Constitution, the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.

21. Since enactment of the ordinances, Plaintiffs have been targeted for harassment and arrested by law enforcement authorities in the above-listed cities, resulting in over 100 arrests of class members. Plaintiffs have been arrested under the guise of nuisance, criminal trespass, disorderly conduct, assault/aggravated assault, as well as being cited for unlawful distribution of handbills.

22. Class members have incurred costs of over $125,00 in fines, bailment, attorney's fees, lost wages, and other expenses as a result of being arrested under these unconstitutional ordinances.

23. Defendants' conduct was done under the color of state law.

24. The Defendants' conduct was unlawful and was beyond Defendants' lawful authority.

25. Plaintiffs were damaged in that they were arrested and jailed; and Plaintiffs were forced to expend over $125,000 in fines, bailments, attorney's fees and other costs.

26. The ordinances have been unevenly and selectively enforced, so as to selectively target and punish

Plaintiffs.

27. The above-listed ordinances violate Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights in that they seek to restrict Plaintiffs' protected conduct, are overbroad, are without a compelling Government interest, and are unconstitutionally vague.

28. The above-cited ordinances are unconstituionally overbroad, in that their rational relationship with their stated purpose of eliminating litter is minimal, there is an inadequate nexus with the stated goal of eliminating litter, and they proscribe conduct which is protected under the First Amendment.

29. The above-cited ordinances are unconstitutionally vague, in that persons of average intelligence may reach differing conclusions as to what conduct is permissible and forbidden.

CAUSES OF ACTION

30. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 29, supra, and incorporate them as if fully set forth herein. The above-listed ordinances violate Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and freedom of speech in that the ordinances constitute an impermissible Government interference with Plaintiffs' first amendment freedom and in particular the free exercise of religion without a compelling Government interest of justification therefore, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, and the Religious

Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 USC 2000 bb-2 et. seq).

31. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 30, supra, and incorporate them as if fully set forth herein. The above-listed ordinances violate Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to freedom of expression in that the ordinances constitute an impermissible Government interference with Plaintiffs' free exercise of expression without a compelling Government interest or justification therefore, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the Constitution of the State of Arkansas and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 USC 2000 bb-2 et. seq).

32. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 31, supra, and incorporate them as if fully set forth herein. The uneven and selective enforcement of the above-listed ordinances deny Plaintiffs of Equal Protection under the law.

33. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 33, supra, and incorporate them as if fully set forth herein. Plaintiffs have been deprived of constitutional protection under color of state law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

34. Plaintiffs request that this Court determine, declare, and rule Alma, Arkansas, municipal ordinance no. 83-3; Dyer, Arkansas, municipal ordinance 83-4; Fort Smith, Arkansas, municipal ordinance § 14-51; and Van Buren, Arkansas, municipal ordinance chapter 5.16, to be unconstitutional in whole or part, both facially and as applied;

have said ordinances stricken as unconstitutional; and to enjoin said cities from enforcing said ordinances.

35. Plaintiffs request $125,000, said amount being the costs Plaintiffs have suffered as a result of the above-listed unconstitutional ordinances, plus attorney's fees and costs.

36. Plaintiffs request punitive damages.

37. Plaintiffs request that the Court hold in abeyance their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims until after the constitutionality of the above-listed ordinances have been determined, and then proceed with that part of this suit.

Respectfully submitted this 17th day of October, 1996.

/s/_____
Susan G. James
Counsel for Plaintiffs

/s/_____
Denise A. Simmons
Counsel for Plaintiffs

APPENDIX H

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[Filed: January 29, 1999]

No. 97- 3359WAFS

ALBERT KRANTZ, et al., Appellants,	)
v.	)
CITY OF FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS, et al., Appellees.	)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING AND FOR REHEARING EN BANC

The petitions for rehearing en banc are denied. The petitions for rehearing by the panel are also denied.

January 29, 1999

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

APPENDIX I

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-3359 WAFS

ALBERT KRANTZ, RON DECKER, DON SWEAT, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,	)
v.	)
CITIES OF ALMA, DYER, FORT SMITH AND VAN BUREN, et al., Defendants.	)

MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES FOR SERVICES RENDERED ON APPEAL

Appellants Albert Krantz, Ron Decker, and Don Sweat, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, move for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses for legal services rendered on this appeal. This motion is made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and pursuant to Eighth Circuit Rule 47C, directing that applications for attorneys' fees for legal services rendered on appeal be made in the Court of Appeals within fourteen days after the entry of this Court's judgment. Judgment was entered on this appeal on November 30, 1998.

In support of this motion, appellants rely upon the attached Affidavit of Eric M. Lieberman, the attached Declaration of Don Sweat, the accompnying memorandum of points and authorities, and the decision rendered by this Court in this case on November 30, 1998. By any standard, appellants are the prevailing party on this appeal, and are entitled to their attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

The amount of attorneys' fees sought by this motion is based upon the number of hours devoted to the appeal by the attorneys multiplied by their usual and prevailing billing rates. In addition, as established by the case law, appellants seek compensation for the time involved in making this fee application. As set forth in the Lieberman affidavit, solely to avoid any conceivable or arguable need for a remand and hearing on the amount of hours devoted to the case, appellants propose to reduce the legal fee award sought by ten percent (10%). Thus, while the fee award would be $125,385.00 if based exclusively on the amount of hours and the prevailing hourly rate, appellants propose a fee award in the mount of $112,846.50. Appellants also seek expense of $3,471.75. If, however, the Court decides that it is necessary to remand for a determination of the amount of the award, appellants reserve the right to seek the full amount of fees, without the ten percent (10%) reduction. The amounts sought do not include the $614.30 sought by appellants' separately filed Bill of Costs for the expense incurred of duplicating the briefs and appendix on the appeal.

Appellants strongly request that this Court determine this fee application by itself now, rather than remand the application to the district court. The application is limited to legal fees for the appeal alone and therefore this Court is in

the best position to judge the merits of the fee request. Moreover, remand would only serve to delay determination and implementation of a fee award, especially since there remain additional matters for the district court to determine, perhaps by trial, on remand. Appellants' counsel already has undertaken substantial work on this appeal for which compensation is due under section 1988, and it would be unjust to delay determination and payment of such fees indefinitely. Finally, determination by this Court now of the amount of the fee award for this appeal would preclude any possible subsequent appellate practice should one party or the other dispute a fee award by the district court. Thus, judicial economy strongly supports such action by this Court on this motion.

The fee award is based upon the following calculations:

Attorney	Number of Hours	Rate	Fee
Eric M. Lieberman	134.50	$350	$ 47,075.00
Andrew J. Fields	263.00	$225	59,175.00
Scott T. Johnson[1]	191.35	$100	19,135.00
	Total	Fees	$125,385.00
	Less	10%	($12,538.50)
	Fees	Sought	$112,846.50
	Expenses		$3,471.75
TOTAL AWARD	SOUGHT		$116,318.25

WHEREFORE, appellants request that this motion be granted and that the Court award appellants the sum of $116,318.25 in attorneys' fees and expenses for services rendered on this appeal, against all appellees, jointly and severally.

Dated: December 11, 1998

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[1] It should be noted that Mr. Johnson was not a licensed attorney during his work on this appeal. He was admitted to the New York State Bar on April 20, 1998.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/_____

Eric M. Lieberman
Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard,
Kirnsky & Lieberman, P.C.
740 Broadway, 5th Floor
New York, NY 10003
(212) 254-1111

Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants

APPENDIX J

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION

[Filed August 28, 1997]

Nos. 95-2135/2136

ALBERT KRANTZ, RON DECKER, DON SWEAT, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,	)
v.	)
CITIES OF ALMA, DYER, FORT SMITH AND VAN BUREN, et al., Defendants.	)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Come now Plaintiffs and file this Notice of Appeal in the above-styled cases from this Court's order of November 27, 1996, granting summary judgment to Defendants, which is now a final appealable order; and the Court's order of July 30, 1997, granting judgment for Defendants.

Respectfully submitted this 27th day of August, 1997.

/s/_____
Susan G. James
Counsel for Plaintiffs

Address of Counsel:

Law Office of
Susan G. James & Associates
600 South McDonough St.
Montgomery, AL 36104
334/269-3330

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and complete copy of the foregoing was served upon Stanley A. Leasure, Daily, West, Core, Cofman & Cofield, P.O. Box 1446, Fort Smith, AR 72902; and J. Denham, P.O. Box 38, North Little Rock, AR 72115, by first-class mail, postage prepaid, this 27th day of August, 1997.

/s/_____
Susan G. James
Of Counsel

APPENDIX K

CITY OF ALMA, ARKANSAS

ORDINANCE NO. 83-3

AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF HANDBILLS, PAMPHLETS AND OTHER HAND DISTRIBUTED ADVERTISEMENTS.

SECTION 1: It shall be unlawful for any person to throw or deposit any commercial or non-commercial handbill or other distributed advertisement in or upon any sidewalk, highway, street, boulevard, alley, or other public way or in or upon any public park, square, public plaza, public recreational area or public building within the City, provided however, that it shall not be unlawful on any sidewalk, street, or any other public place in the City for any person to hand out or distribute any commercial or non-commercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement to any person willing to accept it.

SECTION 2: It shall be unlawful for any person to drop, deposit, or distribute any commercial or non-commercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement in or upon any private premises within the City, except by handing and transmitting any such handbill or advertisement directly to the owner, occupant or other person then present in or upon such private premises, or by so placing or depositing said handbill or advertisement so as to secure and prevent same from being blown or carried about by the elements from any said premises to other public or private

places.

This Section does not apply to those commercial or non-commercial handbills or other hand distributed advertisements which the owner or occupant of the premises or for which the owner or occupant of the premises has otherwise contract for, solicited for, or otherwise authorized the placing or depositing of such handbills or newspapers. Newspapers being defined for the purpose of this Ordinance as: "A publication usually in short form intended for general circulation and published regularly at short intervals, containing intelligence of current events and news of general interest."

SECTION 3: It shall be unlawful for any person to place or deposit any commercial or non-commercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisements upon any vehicle not his own, or in his possession, upon any public street, highway, sidewalk, road, alley within the City of Alma, providing, however, that it shall not be unlawful upon any such street or other public place for a person to hand out and distribute to the receiver therefor, any handbill to any occupant of the vehicle that is willing to accept it.

SECTION 4: Any person found guilty of violating any provision of this Ordinance shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in an amount not more than $500.00 for each violation, or double that sum for each repetition of such offense or violation, and if the act is continuous in nature, in any sum not more than $250.00 for each day which the same shall be unlawfully continued.

SECTION 5: Should any portion of this Ordinance be unconstitutional or invalid and is so declared by a Court of competent jurisdiction, then the remainder of this Ordinance, any and remaining application of this Ordinance, shall not be affected by such partial unconstitutionality or validity.

SECTION 6: That due to the vast amount of handbills and other pamphlets being left on the public and private portions of the City of Alma, Arkansas, caused by the above actions of person, an emergency does therefore exist in that this Ordinance is necessary for the preservation of inhabitants of Alma, Arkansas, and therefore shall be in full force and effect after its passage, approval and publication.

PASSED AND APPROVED this 12 day of April, 1983.

APPROVED:

/s/Manford Burris
MAYOR

APPENDIX L

CITY OF DYER, ARKANSAS

ORDINANCE NO. 83-4

AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF HANDBILLS, PAMPHLETS AND OTHER HAND DISTRIBUTED ADVERTISEMENTS.

BE IT ORDAINED AND ENACTED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE INCORPORATED TOWN OF DYER, ARKANSAS, THAT:

SECTION 1: It shall be unlawful for any person to throw or deposit any commercial or non-commercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement in or upon any sidewalk, highway, street, boulevard, alley, or other public way or in or upon any public park, square, public plaza, public recreational area or public building within the City, provided however, that it shall not be unlawful on any sidewalk, street, or any other public place in the City for any person to hand out or distribute any commercial or non-commercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement to any person willing to accept it.

SECTION 2: It shall be unlawful for any person to drop, deposit, or distribute any commercial or non-commercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement, in or upon any private premises within the City, except by handing and transmitting any such handbill or advertisement directly to the owner, occupant or other person then present

in or upon such private premises or by so placing or depositing said handbill or advertisement so as to secure and prevent same from being blown or carried about by the elements from any said premises to other public or private places.

This Section does not apply to those commercial or non-commercial handbills or other hand distributed advertisements which the owner or occupant of the premises has given permission to be delivered to the owner or occupant of the premises or for which the owner or occupant of the premises has otherwise contracted for, solicited for, or otherwise authorized the placing or depositing of said handbills or advertisement upon the premises.

SECTION 3: It shall be unlawful for any person to place or deposit any commercial or non-commercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisements upon any vehicle not his own, or in his possession, upon any public street, highway, sidewalk, road, alley within the City of Dyer, providing, however, that it shall not be unlawful upon any such street or other public place for a person to hand out and distribute to the receiver therefor, any handbill to any occupant of the vehicle that is willing to accept it.

SECTION 4: Any person found guilty of violating any provision of this Ordinance shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in an amount not more than $500.00 for each violation, or double that sum for each repetition of such offense or violation, and if the act is continuous in nature, in any sum not more than $250.00 for each day which the same shall be unlawfully continued.

SECTION 5: Should any portion of this Ordinance be unconstitutional or invalid and is so declared by a court of competent jurisdiction, then the remainder of this Ordinance, any and remaining application of this Ordinance, shall not be affected by such partial unconstitutionality or validity.

DATED: May 3, 1983 APPROVED:/s/_____
Fayette Peevey
Mayor

ATTEST:/s/_____
Recorder

APPENDIX M

VAN BUREN CITY ORDINANCE
RE: HANDBILLS

Chapter 5.16

HAND DISTRIBUTED MATERIALS

Sections

5.16.01	Public property
5.16.02	Private premises
5.16.03	Vehicles
5.16.04	Penalty

5.16.01 Public Property.

It shall be unlawful for any person to throw or deposit any commercial or noncommercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement in or upon any sidewalk, highway, street, boulevard, public plaza, public recreational area or public building within the city, provided however, that it shall not be unlawful on any sidewalk, street or any other public place in the city for any person to hand out or distribute any commercial or noncommercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement to any person willing to accept it. (Ord. No. 5-1983, Sec. 1)

5.16.02 Private premises.

It shall be unlawful for any person to drop, deposit, or

distribute any commercial or noncommercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement in or upon any private premises within the city, except by handing and transmitting any such handbill or advertisement directly to the owner, occupant or other person when depositing said handbill or advertisement so as to secure and prevent same from being blown or carried about by the elements from any said premises to other public or private place.

This Section does not apply to those commercial or noncommercial handbills or other hand distributed advertisements which the owner or occupant of the premises has given permission to be delivered to the owner or occupant of the premises or for which the owner or occupant of the premises has otherwise contract for, solicited for, or otherwise authorized the placing or depositing of said handbills or advertisement upon the premises. Nor does it apply to newspapers. Newspapers being defined for the purpose of this ordinance as: "A publication usually in sheet form intended for general circulation and published regularly at short intervals, containing intelligence of current events and news of general interest. (Ord. No. 5-1983, Sec. 2)

5.16.03 Vehicles.

It shall be unlawful for any person to place or deposit any commercial or noncommercial handbill or other hand distributed advertisement upon any vehicle not his own, or in his possession, upon any public street, highway, sidewalk, road, alley within the City of Van Buren, provided, however, that it shall not be unlawful upon any such street or other public place for a person to hand out and distribute to the receiver therefor, any handbill to any occupant of the vehicle

that is willing to accept it. (Ord. No. 5-1983, Sec. 3)

5.16.04 Penalty.

Any person found guilty of violating any provision of this ordinance shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in an amount not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) for each violation, or double that sum for each repetition of such offense or violation, and if the act is continuous in nature, in any sum not more than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) for each day which the same shall be unlawfully continued. (Ord. No. 5-1983, Sec. 4)

APPENDIX N

EXCERPTS FROM DEPOSITION OF RONALD DECKER

* * *

[p. 3]

Thereupon,

RONALD DECKER,

having been called for examination, and after being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS THE CITIES OF ALMA, DYER AND VAN BUREN

BY MS. DENHAM:

Q. Would you state your full name, please?

A. Ronald Barry Decker.

Q. Your date of birth, Mr. Decker?

A. November 16, 1950.

Q. Your address?

A. 5201 Spradlin, Fort Smith.

Q. Mr. Decker, my name is Jeannette Denham, and I represent the Cities of Alma, Dyer and Van Buren in the lawsuit. I think you've heard me give the rules regarding depositions. Do you need me to repeat that?

A. No.

Q. How are you currently employed?

A. I'm self-employed.

Q. And what is your occupation?

A. I'm a professional locator.

Q. What does that mean?

* * *

[p. 9]

Q. In Alma?

A. Yes.

Q. More than a hundred?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. What about in Dyer? How many have you passed out?

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you know of anybody that's been arrested or threatened with arrest in Dyer?

A. No.

Q. Do you know of anybody that's been arrested or threatened with arrest in Alma?

A. Yes.

Q. Who?

A. Damon Revas and I believe Tom French, who was here yesterday, and other than that, I'm not really sure on the names.

Q. Do you know what manner of distribution they were using when they were in Alma and had problems?

A. Just what he was saying in his testimony yesterday, I believe it was yesterday, and what I read in his affidavit. I believe they were just walking down the street passing out the "Tracts." I'm not sure how they were doing it.

Q. Do you know of anyone that's been arrested or threatened with arrest in Van Buren?

A. Yes.

* * *

EXCERPTS FROM DEPOSITION OF DONALD RAY SWEAT

* * *

[p. 3]

Thereupon,

DONALD RAY SWEAT,

having been called for examination, and after being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS THE CITIES OF ALMA, DYER AND VAN BUREN

BY MS. DENHAM:

Q. Would you state your full name?

A. Donald Ray Sweat, S-w-e-a-t.

Q. And your address?

A. 5201 Spradlin, Apartment 7-C, Fort Smith, Arkansas, 72904.

Q. And your date of birth, Mr. Sweat?

A. 8-6-50.

Q. My name is Jeanette Denham, and I represent the cities of Alma, Dyer and Van Buren. I think you've heard probably a number of times the rules I've said

regarding depositions. Do you need for me to repeat those?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Okay. Have you ever been arrested?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. When was that?

A. About 1985, maybe.

* * *

[p. 66]

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember what he told you?

A. Arrested.

Q. Do you remember speaking to Toya Espinosa?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember what she told you?

A. Category III.

Q. Do you remember speaking to Suzanne Streit?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember what she told you?

A. Not specifically.

Q. What causes you to fear arrest in Dyer?

A. Personally?

Q. Can you speak for anyone other than yourself?

A. Well, you've been asking me about everyone else.

Q. Well, I asked you a different question this time.

A. Well, I was just clarifying it.

Q. Okay, you.

A. The enactment of the ordinance. It's almost identical to the other cities that have unilaterally expressed intimidating circumstances against anyone distributing gospel literature with the Alamo Christian Churches to the point where they have threatened them with arrest or actually arrested them, harassed them or worse.

Q. Take a look at — What's the "or worse"?

[p. 67]

A. Threats of violence against them such as, "Going to punch your teeth out."

Q. When did that occur?

A. I can't remember specifically. I think you heard testimony of that the other day from John Falasz or one of those. I think it was John Falasz. I can't remember.

Q. Where did that occur?

A. Fort Smith.

Q. What occasioned you to fear arrest in Dyer?

A. Well, that would have much of a bearing on it. These are small communities. You drive from one side of the street to the other in some of them and you go from one municipality to the other. I mean geographically there is not much difference and the people aren't much different. It's not like you're going into a foreign country.

Q. Where have you distributed "Tracts?"

A. Probably about forty states in the United States, Canada and Mexico.

Q. Have you ever been arrested in those places?

A. Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Q. Other than that place?

A. No.

Q. Do you know about any handbill ordinances in any

other cities they have in the U.S.

A. A little bit.

EXCERPTS FROM DEPOSITION
OF REBECCA AVILA

* * *

[p. 3]

Thereupon,

REBECCA AVILA

having been called for examination, and after being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS
THE CITIES OF ALMA, DYER AND VAN BUREN

BY MS. DENHAM:

Q. Would you state your full name, sir?

A. Rebecca Avila, A-V-I-L-A.

Q. And your address?

A. 5201 Spradlin, Apartment 9-C, Fort Smith.

Q. Your date of birth?

A. 12-28-57.

Q. Mrs., it is Mrs. Avila?

A. Yes.

Q. My name is Jeannette Denham, and I represent the cities of Alma, Dyer and Van Buren in the lawsuit. Were you here this morning when I went over the rules regarding depositions?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you need for me to repeat those?

A. No.

Q. When did you first become affiliated with Tony Alamo or

[p. 4]

any of his organizations?

A. In '79.

Q. And where were you?

A. In California.

Q. When did you first come to the Arkansas area?

A. In 1980, October of '80.

Q. Have you been a resident of this area since then?

A. No.

Q. When did you first start tracting in the Northwest Arkansas area?

A. Probably '83.

Q. When did you leave Arkansas?

A. We moved to Nashville for approximately two years, I think it was '86 and '87.

Q. After that did you come back to Arkansas?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you been here, have you resided in Arkansas since then?

A. No.

Q. When did you go away from Arkansas, again?

A. We lived in Florida for, in February, or excuse me, March of '91. We moved to Florida for a while.

Q. When did you come back to Arkansas?

A. In November of '91.

Q. Have you been here as a resident since then?

[p. 5]

A. Yes.

Q. Have you ever tracted in Dyer, Arkansas?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever tracted in Alma, Arkansas?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you ever tracted in Van Buren?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you ever tracted in Fort Smith?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know of anybody that's tracted in Dyer?

A. No.

Q. Do you know of anybody that's been arrested or threatened with arrest for tracting in Dyer?

A. No.

Q. What occasions you to believe that you have a fear of being arrested or threatened with arrest in Dyer?

A. Because of all the different things that have been said in the media against our church and against our pastor, and that's where our church was for many years.

Q. Okay. Do you tract in other cities outside of these

four cities?

A. Yes.

Q. Then what's different about you tracting in those cities than in Dyer? I mean, if you're talking about media coverage of your pastor in newspapers or on television, that goes to . . .

* * *

[p. 10]

church sixteen, going on seventeen years, and there have been many things said.

Q. Okay. So let's make sure we're on the same wave length here. Do you know of anything that a newspaper or a television station has reported that they've said comes from a law enforcement person from the City of Dyer that's negative about your church?

A. I would have to think about it to be sure.

Q. Well, how much time do you need to think about it?

A. Well, it wouldn't be specifically a law official from Dyer. I can't remember that.

Q. Okay. So then your basic concern about going to Dyer would be that because your church was there you believe that the people in the town would not welcome your literature?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know which sub-class you're in?

A. Class III.

Q. Class III. What gives you a fear of being arrested or threatened with arrest for tracting in Alma?

A. Basically the same reason as Dyer, because we did have living facilities there for many years and different businesses, and basically for the same reason, because of all the harassment and all the different news media things that have been said.

Q. Okay. So now when you're talking about news media, are . . .

* * *